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THE MARKET FOR SOFTWARE INNOVATION THROUGH THE LENS
OF PATENT LICENSES AND SALES*
COLLEEN V. CHIEN1

ABSTRACT
Software innovation is transforming the US economy. Yet our understanding of how patents and
patent transactions support this innovation is limited, in part because of a lack of public information
about patent licenses and sales. Claims about the patent marketplace, for example, extolling the virtues
of intermediaries like non-practicing entities, or questioning the social utility of ex post patent licenses,
tend not to be grounded in empirical evidence. This article brings much-needed data to the policy
debate by analyzing transactional data from several proprietary databases of patent licenses and
transfers, and reporting several novel findings. First I find that, despite recent legal developments that
have reduced the enforceability of software patents, the market for software patents is remarkably
robust and actually grew, not declined, from 2012 to 2015. I speculate that the strength of this demand
is driven by the defensive, not only offensive, value of software patents, the importance of software
business models, and bargain shopping in the acquisition of patents. Second, I explore the extent to
which software patent transfers support the transfer of technology as opposed to supporting just the
transfer of liability, or freedom from suit, with mixed results. I find that the majority of material
software licenses reported by public companies to the SEC from 2000-2015 (N=245), which are nonrepresentative of licenses in general, to support true technology transfer. However, I also find evidence
that in recent years, large numbers of software patents apparently been sold to avoid litigation or
provide general operating freedom, rather than to access specific technologies. Software patents
transferred between public companies between 2012 and 2015 were two to three times more likely to
go from an older company to a younger company, and from a higher revenue to a lower revenue
public company. This finding lends some support to the perception that software patents are a tax on
innovation that younger, lower revenue companies must pay to older firms with higher revenue.

*
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I.

INTRODUCTION
“Software is eating the world” -- Marc Andreesen 2

The same week that Marc Andreessen published his well-known 2011 essay, “Why Software is
Eating the World,” Google moved to buy handset-maker Motorola Mobility for $12.5 billion. 3
Andreesen cited this development and others, including the rise of software companies like Amazon,
Netflix, and Shutterfly and the demise of bricks-and-mortar companies like Borders, Blockbuster, and
Kodak, for the proposition that software had or would be disrupting industries across the economy,
requiring companies to adapt to new, digitally-driven business models, or die. Since then, the
transformations of the car riding industry by “sharing economy” software companies such as Uber
and Lyft, demonstrate what researchers have found: that traditional sectors of the economy, including
automobiles, aerospace and defense, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals are increasingly turning to
software to differentiate products, enhance product performance, and increase user utility. . 4 But just
as Google’s acquisition underscored the dominance of new, digital companies, it also demonstrated
the importance of an instrument that has existed for over two hundred years, 5 the United States (U.S.)
patent. Because while Google acquired Motorola’s physical assets through the deal, its main objective
was to acquire Motorola’s intangible assets, its patents. 6 As Google CEO Larry Page wrote in a blog
post, Motorola’s patents were key to protecting Google’s Android operating system from potential
attacks by competitors like Microsoft, Apple, and others. 7

2 Marc Andreessen, Why Software is Eating the World, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 20, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460.html.
3 Id.; Evelyn M. Rusli & Clair Cain Miller, Google to Buy Motorola Mobility for $12.5 Billion, THE NEW YORK TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Aug. 15, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/google-to-buy-motorola-mobility/?_r=0.
4 Lee Branstetter, Matej Drev, and Namho Kwon, Get With the Program: Software-Driven Innovation in Traditional Manufacturing,
NBER Working Paper No. w21752. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2699996 5 The first era of U.S. patenting was from
1790 to 1793, and resulted in few issuances. Described in EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE
PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798–1836 259–64 (1998).
5 The first era of U.S. patenting was from 1790 to 1793, and resulted in few issuances. Described in EDWARD C.
WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION, 1798–1836 259–64 (1998).
6 See, e.g., description of the deal in WALTER ISAACSON, THE INNOVATORS: HOW A GROUP OF HACKERS,
GENIUSES, AND GEEKS CREATED THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION __ (2014).
7 Larry Page, Supercharging Android: Google To Acquire Motorola Mobility, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Aug. 15, 2011),
https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/supercharging-android-google-to-acquire.html.
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Source: Colleen V. Chien, Opening the Patent System: Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law, 89 SO.
CAL. L. REV. 4 (2016) data from PATSTAT, taxonomy from WIPO. 8
Just as software innovation is on the rise, so is software patenting, at least in the US. Identifying
software patents is notoriously difficult, but applying the World Intellectual Property Organization’s
industry definitions, the share of U.S. patents that can be classified under “Electrical Engineering” –
a class that includes digital communications, computer technology, and communications, among
others 9– has grown markedly. In 1975, about 15% of all new US patents were electrical engineering,
with no one industry grouping capturing a majority of patents. In 2015, the electrical engineering share
rose to nearly 50%. (FIG __) The remaining industry segments – including instruments, chemicals (a
category that includes pharmaceutical drugs) and mechanical engineering – divided, roughly evenly,
most of the remainder. (FIG __)
The question is whether software is eating the world because of software patents, despite them,
or something else. Patents encourage investment and risk-taking in innovation by granting exclusive
rights in exchange for novel, nonobvious inventions. But they can also interfere with downstream
innovation by preventing others, including those who invent independently, from practicing their own
inventions. Young companies experience these tradeoffs most acutely: when a startup gets a patent,
8

Accord, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO_economic_WP_2015-01_v2.pdf, Figure 11
(showing that annual patent grants in the “Computers & Communications and Electrical & Electronics NBER
categories vastly outnumber patents in all other categories beginning in the early 2000s.”)
9 For a description of the scheme, including a complete list of subclasses within “Electrical Engineering,” and their
rationale, see Ulrich Schmoch, Concept of a Technology Classification for Country Comparisons: Final Report to the World Intellectual
Property
Office
(WIPO),
FRAUNHOFER
ISI.
(June
2008),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdf/wipo_ipc_technology.pdf. This approach
was developed later than the industry categorization developed by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg as described in: Bronwyn
H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES.
(Oct. 1, 2001), http://www.nber.org/papers/w8498.pdf, and is preferred for this reason.
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its likelihood of funding rises, 10 as most small firms don’t patent. 11 But if the company becomes the
target of litigation, the event is highly disruptive, and can cause the firm to pivot away from products
lines 12 or reduce research and development (“R&D”) expenditures. 13
To be sure, whether these dynamics are at the periphery of software innovation, or – at the heart
of it – is unclear. According to one view, the value proposition associated with software-based
innovation is so compelling that such innovation will happen regardless of the initial distribution of
rights under patent law, which can be altered by contract. 14 In the digital world, monopolies are driven
not by the right to exclude conferred by patents, but by network effects, scale, 15 and winner-take-all
economics. 16 But patents are hard to ignore when Google spends more money on them than on R&D,
as it did in the year of the Motorola purchase. 17 So did Apple that year, when it contributed to the
purchase of patents from defunct telecommunications equipment provider Nortel for $4.5 billion. 18
These sales were huge and anomalous, but also raise concerns about the vulnerability of those with
fewer resources to buy protection or patents, which includes just about every other company.
The controversy over software patents also extends to software patent transactions. Patent
transactions can enhance the patent system’s incentive-inducing role by supporting specialization and
extending the reach of the patent system to those who invent regardless of their position in the
marketplace, helping to overcome the advantages of incumbents. 19 A startup company’s ability to
license or sell, rather than develop their technology reduces its market risks and enhances innovation
through its transfer of technology. Patents can support the diffusion of software innovation between
firms by providing transferable, tradeable assets.
But the growth in software patent litigation, including by non-practicing entities (“NPEs”), patent
assertion entities 20 or “trolls,” has also been supported by the patent marketplace. In a 2011 report to
10 See, e.g., Joan Farre-Mensa et al., The Bright Side of Patents (USPTO Economic Working Paper No. 2015-5,
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2704028.
11
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2637602
12 See, e.g., Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, SANTA CLARA LAW DIGITAL COMMONS (Sept. 13, 2012),
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1554&context=facpubs; see also Colleen Chien, Startups
and
Patent
Assertion,
SANTA
CLARA
LAW
DIGITAL
COMMONS
(Sept.
2013),
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/856/.
13 See, e.g., Catherine E. Tucker, Patent Trolls and Technology Diffusion (TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2012-030, 2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2136955, Scott Morton, Fiona and Carl Shapiro. 2014. “Strategic
Patent Acquisitions,” Antitrust Law Journal 79 (2): 463- 499 (finding the enhanced monetization of patents by patent
assertion entities (PAEs) to be harmful to innovation); Smeets, Roger. 2014. “Does Patent Litigation Reduce Corporate
R&D? An Analysis of US Public Firms” Rutgers University working paper [can we email Smeets for the final copy?] [Also
I’d like us to add parentheticals for Tucker and Smeets]
14 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1293 (1996).
15 As discussed in PETER THIEL, ZERO TO ONE [add pincite] (2014).
16 See, e.g., Om Malik, In Silicon Valley Now, It’s Almost Always Winner Takes All, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 30, 2015),
www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/in-silicon-valley-now-its-almost-always-winner-takes-all.
17 Based on public filings and data, in 2012, Google spent $12.5 billion to buy Motorola Mobility and its patents, and $5.2
billion on R&D. In 2011, Apple spent $2.4 billion on R&D but contributed more, at least $2.6 billion (estimated), to a
single transaction to buy patents from Nortel. See Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 329
nn.11 & 12 (2012).
18 Id.
19 As discussed infra at Part ____.
20 See, e.g., Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation (2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf, and slate of USPTO-led Executive Actions on
High-Tech Patents, including “Clarity in Patent Claims,” and “Crowdsourcing of Prior Art,” directed at software patents,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/uspto-led-executive-actions-high-tech-patent-issues.
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Congress, the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) found that lawsuits involving software-related
patents accounted for 89% of the increase in defendants from 2007-2011 and that between 2007 and
2011, two-thirds of defendants were sued over software-related patents. 21 The majority of the patents
held by NPEs have been bought in the marketplace from operating companies, studies have found. 22
These transfers support not only the transfer of technology but also the transfer of the legal right to
sue, from operating companies that are limited in their ability to sue, due to reputational and counterassertion risks, to those without such limits.
Law academics have written dozens of studies on the topic of patent litigation by patent assertion
entities alone, 23 much of it involving software inventions. 24 Relatively less empirical attention, with a
few notable exceptions, 25 has been devoted to the considerable “middle layer” of events between the
prosecution and litigation of a patent, in particular, a patent’s licensing, sale, and related transactions. 26
(FIG. __)
FIG___: Events in a Patent’s Lifecycle

Adapted from Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX L. REV. 283, 300 (2011)

21 General Accounting Office, Intellectual Property: Assessing Factors that Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve
Patent Quality, GAO-13-465 (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-465.
22 Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 485-88 (2012) (finding, based on studying 347
patents, that 243 were initially assigned to a company, and “more than 75% of these companies were corporations while
the remainder were LLCs and limited partnerships”).
23 See the studies cited by two letters sent to members of Congress in 2015: Letter from Forty Economists and Law
Professors to House and Senate Judiciary Committees (Mar. 10, 2015), http://cpip.gmu.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/Economists-Law-Profs-Letter-re-Patent-Reform.pdf; Letter from Fifty-One Intellectual
Property Scholars to the Members of Congress (Mar. 3, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/03/rewards-effectivereform.html; and, the studies cited by The Patent Litigation Landscape: Recent Research and Developments, THE COUNCIL OF
ECON.
ADVISORS
ISSUE
BRIEF,
Mar.
2016,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/201603_patent_litigation_issue_brief_cea.pdf.
24 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Edward Reines, Why Technology Customers Are Being Sued En Masse for Patent Infringement and
What Can Be Done, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 235 (describing the assertion of patents against large numbers of end-user
defendants based on digital innovations).
25 Two are Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent
Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255 (2009) (hereafter referred to as the “Berkeley Patent Survey”),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1429049, which probed patent licensing and financing in depth by
surveying entrepreneurs; and, Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283 (2011),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911579&, an empirical study of securitization, reassignment, and
other characteristics of patents “acquired” after issuance, as well as those developed before issuance and their influence
on a patent‘s propensity to be litigated. Both are discussed in greater detail in Part __.
26 There are a greater number of economics studies on these topics, as recounted in greater detail in Part ___.
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The gap in the literature is understandable in light of the lack of public information about the
marketplace for patents. There is no requirement to publicly record patent licenses, for example, much
less to disclose the prices of such transactions. 27 Even when licenses are disclosed during the course
of litigation, which are public proceedings, their terms are often kept secret behind protective orders. 28
But the gap is also highly problematic insofar as it produces at best an incomplete and at worst a
distorted understanding of the relationship between patents and software innovation. Claims about
the patent marketplace for example, extolling its virtues 29 or questioning its social utility, 30 for example,
tend not to be grounded in empirical evidence. Patent litigation involves an estimated 1-2% of all
patents, yet occupies a much larger share of policy and academic attention, creating at least two
additional risks. First, neglect of commercially important but non-litigated patents may be leading to
missed opportunities to observe and improve innovation and patent policy. Second, policy-making
intended to address the 1-2% of litigated patents may have unintended and potentially negative
consequences for the patent system’s important functions of facilitating financing, transactions, and
the freedom to operate.
This paper is part of a larger project to address the substantial void in our understanding of the
market for patents and patented innovations, 31 which, for the reasons elaborated in Part ___ , have
long been considered “the dark continent.” It leverages two datasets to address the questions that to
date have been largely unanswerable in any systematic way about the role of the patent marketplace in
promoting or hindering innovation. The first database, of “patent transfers” includes the universe of
standalone software and related patent reassignments 32 recorded at the USPTO from 2012 through
2015, as provided by Innography. The second database comprises “material technology licenses”
recorded with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from 2000 to 2015. While each dataset
has its strengths and limitations, discussed in depth in Part ___ it should be noted that the material
technology license database by its own terms has a much narrower range that does not include licenses
between private companies, or agreements signed by public companies that do not reach the threshold
of “materiality” that triggers disclosure. 33 For at least this reason, our findings with respect to licenses
should be understood as reflective of a cross-section of material licenses, rather than representative
of licensing in general.
The analyses I describe here support several findings about the market for software innovation
and its role in encouraging innovations. First, while most of the academic and policy attention devoted
to software patents has focused on their litigation, I find, consistent with other studies, that the chance
of a software patent being traded or licensed is much greater than the chances of it being litigated. 34
27 See, e.g., Carlos C. Serrano, The Dynamics of the Transfer and Renewal of Patents, 41 RAND J. ECON. 686, 690 (2010)
(describing the lack of a requirement to publicly record patent licenses, and providing a summary of the anecdotal data
that is available).
28 See, discussion in Part ___ infra.
29 Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137 (2015).
30 Michael J. Burstein, Patent Markets: A Framework For Evaluation, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 407 (2015).
31 Currently filled by the resources described in Section ____ .
32
That is, assignments subsequent to the initial assignment.
33
See description of the materiality requirement in Part ___, infra.
34 See Serrano, The Dynamics Of The Transfer And Renewal Of Patents, supra note ___ (finding that about 13.5% of patents are
transferred at least once over their lifetime), and http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2696147
(reporting an annual patent “churn” rate of 4.5% per year). Though each of these and this study uses a different
methodology to track reassignments, making direct comparisons difficult, they consistently report a greater transfer than
litigation hazard).
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While patent litigation involves an estimated 1-2% of all patents, 35 software patents are being sold in
standalone transactions in at a much higher rate – around 1.5% per year from 2012-2015. In addition,
the decline in the enforceability over the past few years of software patents has not led to a
corresponding slowdown in patent sales. To the contrary, the number and share of software patent
transfers increased, not decreased, between 2012 and 2015 I find. I speculate that this rise is due to
bargain shopping (as prices per patent have declined), the robustness of defensive patenting strategies,
and the underlying significance and importance of software innovation.
Second, I used the data to probe the extent to which the market for software patents primarily
supports the transfer of technology or the transfer of rights, with mixed results. Recent studies suggest
that patent licenses rarely are accompanied by technology transfer when initiated by the patentholder. 36
But my analysis of material software technology licenses reported to the SEC finds that in most cases,
when patents were licensed, so were know-how, trade secrets or code. This suggest that, among this
subset of licenses at least, agreements supported the transfer of technology, rather than just naked
patent rights.
When looking at recorded transfers of software patents from 2012-2015, however, it appears that
patents are being transferred to support the transfer of technology as well as to head off or avoid
disputes, or to bolster a firm’s freedom to operate. Among companies for whom age information
could be found, we found software patents overwhelmingly more likely to be sold from older to
younger companies, and from companies with more revenue to companies with less revenue. I
speculate the reasons for these trends, which I believe deserve further consideration and analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows: Part I describes the theory and available evidence about the
licensing and sale of patents, in particular software patents, and the role of patent transactions in
supporting software innovation. Part II describes the methods, data sources, and approaches this
paper used to advance current understanding. Part III discusses my findings and their implications.
Part IV concludes.
II.

PART I: THEORY AND EVIDENCE REGARDING THE LICENSING AND
SALE OF PATENTS, IN PARTICULAR SOFTWARE PATENTS
TRANSFERRING RIGHTS AND TRANSFERRING TECHNOLOGY IN THE PATENT MARKETPLACE

The purpose of the patent system, as enshrined in the Constitution, is to “…promote
the progress of [] useful arts, by securing for limited times to [] Inventors the exclusive right to their
[] discoveries....” 37 According to the “incentive to invent” story, an inventor comes up with a product,
obtains a patent over it, and uses the patent to deter others from copying. 38 Ex ante, the inventor is
35 Lerner et al. document the litigation hazard rate for a selected group of patents at about 1.29% with financial services
patents almost twice as likely to be litigated. However, this study likely understates the total because of the age of the
patents studied. Josh Lerner et al., Financial Patent Quality: Finance Patents After State Street,(Harvard Business School,
Working Paper 16-068, 2015), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/16-068_702dabb8-70c5-4917-a25775dc8b0c4f6b.pdf.
36 Feldman & Lemley, supra note ___.
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
38 Described, e.g., in Michael J. Burstein, Patent Markets: A Framework For Evaluation, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 507, 516 (2015).
Across surveys, deterring copying is consistently reported as the top reason that inventors patent. See, e.g., Graham et al.,
35
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encouraged to take greater risks and engage in more R&D because of the protection the patent
provides; and ex post, make greater investments in commercialization and dissemination. 39
Transactional justifications for the patent system adjust this story in a few ways. Ex
ante, transactional freedom strengthens the basic incentive to invent as the ability of patentees to sell
their technology to those who can more efficiently develop and commercialize technology
“prospects” 40 raises the likelihood of a favorable return on investment. Ex post, patents make
transactions more likely in several ways. First, they create defined property rights that are, unlike
unregistered rights such as trade secrets, observable. The boundaries of patent rights are also more
readily ascertainable than trade secrets, defining the duration of the right and the scope of the claims
so that the parties don’t have to. 41 Patents increase the confidence of patentholders in that their
inventions won’t be copied based on negotiation disclosures, thereby overcoming the challenge of
selling information known as the “Arrow information paradox.” 42 Patents can also promote freedom
to operate 43 and access to capital and talent44 by signaling a small or young firm’s innovative potential
to investors 45 or banks (through the securitization process) 46 or directly, through sales or licensing.
But just as patent transfers exploit comparative advantages in commercialization, they
can also exploit comparative advantages in enforcement. 47 While both forms of transfer can promote
supra note___. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing
Firms Patent (Or Not) figures 7–8, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) (showing that 96% of the
1,478 R&D managers surveyed by Cohen and his colleagues indicated that preventing copying motivated the acquisition
of their last product innovation patent); Sadao Nagaoka & John P. Walsh, Commercialization and Other Uses of Patents in Japan
and the U.S.: Major Findings from the RIETI-Georgia Tech Inventor Survey at fig. 13 (Ga. Tech Sch. of Pub. Policy, Working Paper
No. 47, 2009) (describing the results of a survey of inventors of “triadic patents”—patents whose applications were filed
in both the Japanese Patent Office and the European Patent Office and granted in the United States Patent Office and
finding that 82% of the 7,933 American inventors selected enhancing exclusive exploitation, followed by blocking, as the
top answer to the question of what motivated their patenting); Gaetan de Rassenfosse & Dominique Guellec, Motivations
to
Patent:
Empirical
Evidence
From
an
International
Survey,
2,
8,
Tbl.
2,
http://www.epip.eu/conferences/epip04/files/DERASSENFOSSE_Gaetan_2.pdf (reporting that, “to prevent imitations by
competitors” was the top motivator for getting patents among 604 respondents to a survey sent to randomly selected
applicants of European Patent Office (EPO) patents).
39 See Mark Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004).
40 See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 373-76 (2010); Michael Abramowicz, The Danger
of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1068-70 (2007).
41 On the transactional advantages of patents over trade secrets, which are available even in the absence of compelling
evidence of their impact on incentives to invent, and which don’t risk destruction upon disclosure, see WILLIAM M. LANDES
& RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).
42 As Robert Merges describes, “To sell, one must disclose the information, but once the information is disclosed, the
recipient has it and need not buy it. On the other hand, if one does not disclose anything the buyer has no idea what is for
sale.” Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75
(1994).
43 For a description of the pursuit of freedom to operate and other defensive motives and their contribution to patenting
trends, see, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 326, 328 (2010).
44 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477 (2005).
45 Carolin Haeussler et al., To Be Financed or Not… - The Role of Patents for Venture Capital Financing (ZEW - Centre for Eur.
Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No. 09-003, 2012).
46 Aleksander Nikolic, Securitization of Patents and Its Continued Viability in Light of the Current Economic Conditions, 19 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 393 (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2644638.
47 Alberto Galasso et al.,Trading and Enforcing Patent Rights, 44 RAND J. ECON 275, 302 (2013). (“(“Our estimates suggest
that patents with low values of P (defined as an estimate of probability of not having changed ownership) are more likely
to be involved in transactions driven by product market gains, and patents with high P are more likely to be involved in
transactions driven by enforcement gains.”)
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innovation, how, and whether they do, on balance, varies. As Justice Kennedy has noted, there is a
difference between the use of patents “as a basis for producing and selling goods” and as a “bargaining
tool to charge exorbitant fees.” 48 Many commentators and policymakers have made similar
distinctions, generally agreeing that while patent transfers that support technology transfer increase
social welfare, licenses driven primarily by avoiding the cost of litigation or switching costs, rather
than the value of the technology, 49 on balance, decrease social welfare. 50
SOFTWARE PATENTS AND THE PATENT MARKETPLACE
To what extent do theories of the patent system described above explain the present relationship
between software patents and software innovation? In many respects, the fit between the primary,
“incentive to invent” story of the patent system and software innovation is poor. 51 Software
innovations tend to be incremental, conceptual, and algorithmic; patents are supposed to be reserved
for only non-obvious, 52 non-abstract, and non-mathematical inventions. 53 As property rights, patents
function best when they articulate clear boundaries for the range of excluded behavior. However,
software patent boundaries are notoriously “fuzzy,” 54 given their functional nature, reliance on nonspecific language 55 that captures the function rather than the form of the underlying code, and the use
of “patentese” 56 – the special, technical, legal language of patents. 57 Software cycles tend to be short,
while patent cycles are long. It currently takes, on average, 17 months for the U.S. Patent and
48 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
49 Acknowledging that it may be difficult to develop a consensus regarding whether or not a license falls into this category,
see Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (describing how even
nuisance settlements can also function as last resorts for patentees confronted by infringers who refuse to provide license
fees or “hold-out”).
50 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, ___(2012) (describing nuisance fee-driven
patent litigation and settlement); The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Mar. 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligningpatent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf; Burstein, supra note __; and
Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1588
(2009) (describing “inefficient, socially wasteful patent transactions” carried out by patent “trolls”).
51 For a summary of the pros and cons of patents for software startups, based on about sixty interviews with software
developers, venture capitalists, angel investors, banks that lend to software startups, large software and hardware firms,
and others, see Ronald Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L REV. 961 (2005).
52 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Restricting patentability to non-obvious subject matter).
53 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (“abstract ideas”, “mathematical formula”, “algorithms” are not patentable).
54 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREACRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT
INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008).
55
https://www.flickr.com/photos/opensourceway/6554315093/sizes/l.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/opensourceway/6554315093/sizes/l.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/opensourceway/6554315093/sizes/l. To take one recent example, does the term
“distributed learning control module” cover any software or hardware that carries out a set of basic functions, specifically,
the functions of “receiving communications transmitted between the presenter and the audience member computer
systems and for relaying the communications to an intended receiving computer system and for coordinating the operation
of the streaming data module”? US Patent 6, 155, 840. Until recently, even the courts haven’t been sure. See, e.g., Williamson
v. Citrix Online, L.L.C., 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The use of vague terms in software patents like “module,” has
prompted one parody patent drawing that consists of a combination of “thing-a-ma-jig”s, “stuff, “whatzit”s, “doo-hickie”s
and “you know.” https://www.flickr.com/photos/opensourceway/6554315093/sizes/l.
56 Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 627627627633 (2010).
57 Id. at 633-634.
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Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to begin examining a patent application, and about another 10 months
for it to complete examination. 58 Under the normal default, the patent application will publish at 18
months, 59 and a patent can stay in force for up to 20 years from the date of filing. But in fields like
smartphone mobile applications (or “apps”), the market environment is changing quickly. 60 Many apps
fail within weeks if not months, making it hard to know ex ante whether or not the software is worth
protecting. 61 Imitation cycles are also short, with the most successful applications imitated within
months; 62 meaning that the whole cycle from conception of a feature for the mobile app, to its copying
by another can happen even before the patent application matures into a patent.
According to a recent study by Christian Helmers and his colleagues, only a tiny share –around
0.04% – of smartphone applications available in the Apple iOS store are protected by app-relevant
patents. 63 There are obviously counterexamples to the app industry – software areas that are heavily
patented, and rely on much longer product cycles. Even in the app environment, patented apps
command higher prices, and are more likely to be rated extensively. 64 But the sense that software is
different 65 has led prominent leaders in the industry to reject the premise that software patents are
necessary to incent software innovation. 66 As the Berkeley Patent Survey found, two-thirds of software
entrepreneurs do not have or seek patents. 67
But the same Survey found that among venture backed software startups, the majority
68
had patents. One of the reasons that venture capitalists like patents is because they can distinguish
firms with unique, proprietary technologies, and provide salvageable assets should the firm fail. Within
firms, the successful pursuit of patents can support the creation of jobs and sales growth. 69 But filing
for patents takes resources away from engineering tasks, 70 and patent litigation demands are a
58 USPTO Dashboard, http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
59 35 U.S.C. § 122.
60 Christian Helmers, Sebastian G. J. Brandes Kraaijenzank, Yongdong Liu, Innovation without Patents? Evidence from the
Smartphone App Markets, 2014 draft available at
https://www.dropbox.com/s/mb4yqhfulq2whzl/Helmers%20on%20apps.pdf?dl=0 ; 2014 draft on file with the author.
[I INSERTED A DROPBOX LINK AS I DON’T THINK THE 2014 VERSION IS POSTED – YOU MAY WANT
TO DL FOR YOUR RECORDS]
61
Assuming that it contains protectable inventions.
62 Id. at Fig 2-5.
63 Id. at Table 4. Across all app stores in the study, it’s 4.5%.
64 Id. at Table 5.
65 See, e.g., Github conversation between Marc Andreesen and Peter Thiel, https://gist.github.com/jm3/2669267 (“There
are some areas in tech—drugs and mechanical equipment, for instance—where parents are fundamental. In these areas
there are long established historical norms for who gets to do what. But in software, things change extremely quickly. The
big companies used to have huge war chests full of patents and use them to squash little guys. Now they’re fighting each
other. The ultimate terminal state of big companies seems to be a state in which they build nothing. Instead, they just add
10,000 patents to their portfolio every year and try to extract money through licensing. It’d be nice if none of this were
the case. But it’s not startups’ fault that the patent system is broken. So if you have a startup, you just have to fight through
it. Find the best middle ground strategy.”).
66 See, e.g., Fred Wilson, Enough is Enough, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 1, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/enoughis-enough-2011-6 (“I believe that software patents should not exist”).
67 Graham et al., supra note ___ at Table 1.
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., Joan Farre-Mensa et al., The Bright Side of Patents (USPTO Economic Working Paper No. 2015-5, 2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2704028; David H. Hsu & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Patents as Quality
Signals for Entrepreneurial Ventures (Apr. 2007) (on file with author) (finding that patents have a positive effect on startup
company value).
70 Ronald Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX L. REV. 961, 982-84 (2005).
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distraction and strain on the innovative enterprise, sometimes taking a significant operational toll on
small companies. 71
While valuable, studies about filing for, obtaining, and litigating patents are at the
periphery of the patent market. Patent licenses signed as the result of patent litigation are a highly
selected part of the patent market, and because they are formed ex post, they also tend to take place
after technology has been transferred or copied, or independently invented. 72 Funding events that
follow the issuance of patents do not represent market transactions of the patent, and the extent to
which patent-holding causes funding events, rather than being a characteristic of fundable, well-run
startups, is hard to tease apart. Studies that focus on the strategic acquisition of patents in order to
litigate them, 73 in turn, do not address sale of patents for commercialization and other objectives.
The present study is different, because it directly observes actual transactions – licenses
and sales – in the marketplace for patented software innovations. 74By studying recorded sales in
general, and reported, material licenses in particular, these transactions span a variety of reasons that
patents are licensed and sold, enabling their direct comparison.
1. Transfers of Rights vs. Transfers of Technology
In this paper I distinguish between patent transactions that affect technology transfers
and patent transactions that affect rights, or liability transfers. A patent-centric view glosses over this
distinction, finding that all patent transactions happen in the shadow of litigation, and are driven by
consideration of how a court might view the settlement in subsequent litigation. 75 But while some
licenses are motivated by the desire to avoid suit, others are motivated by the desire to gain technology.
Rather than happening in the shadow of litigation, agreements to transfer the technology happen in
the shadow of the market, and competition, for example in the race to be first to market. Rather than
being driven by the cost of litigation, the price of licenses to transfer technology is driven by the value
of the technology and the extent to which the technology can accelerate development of a product or
yield a return for the business. While those forced to take patent licenses in order to avoid being sued
are in some sense reluctant licensees, those who seek out licensing partners in order to access their
technology represent willing licensees.
The distinction has not only descriptive but also normative significance. Those who
extol the virtue of patent markets credit to them the benefits of the technology transfer, including
gains associated with specialization in innovation. But not every patent license achieves these gains.
Some transfers of rights are in effect just preemptive legal settlements that eliminate the risk of
potentially rent-seeking lawsuits. While such transfers could be welfare-enhancing, insofar as they

71 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461 (2014); Colleen V. Chien, Patent
Assertion
and
Startup
Innovation,
OPEN
TECHNOLOGY
INSTITUTE
(Sept.
5,
2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2321340; and, James Bessen, The Evidence is In: Patent Trolls Do Hurt
Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/the-evidence-is-in-patent-trolls-do-hurtinnovation/ [add parenthetical]; see also Letter from Startup Investors to Congress (Mar. 17, 2015), http://engine.is/wpcontent/uploads/VCsforPatentReformLtr2015-1.pdf.
72 Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1465 (2009).
73
See, e.g. http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/pae.pdf
74 The licenses admittedly through a highly selected vantage point, as described further in Part __.
75 Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 115 (2015).
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support the exclusion that animates the incentive to invent story, 76 they can also be welfare-reducing
when they involve the enforcement of a wrongly-issued patent, or encourage enforcement and
settlements based on the cost of litigation and switching costs, rather than the value of the
technology. 77 In the following paragraphs, I review existing work as a backdrop to the present study.
2. Studies of the Patent Marketplace: Transferring Technology and Transferring Rents
Lamoreaux and Sokoloff have performed the most significant early work on markets
for technology in the 19th century using the patent record. 78 Made known by weekly descriptions
published in The Scientific American starting in 1845 and the patent lawyers and agents who acted as
intermediaries, 19th century patents frequently changed hands. 79 Lamoreaux and Sokoloff estimate that
approximately 12% to 28% of patents were assigned more than once, including through corporate
acquisition. 80 These sales, as well as other information, provide evidence that patents supported the
buying and selling of technology more broadly, not just the buying and selling of the patents
themselves. But other studies have documented the use of 19th century patents for the purpose of
transferring the rights to sue others as well, in the context of farming and railroad patents. 81 In the
case of farming patents, trivial improvements formed the basis of patents that were used to demand
royalties from unsuspecting farmers, many of whom bought the allegedly infringing technology. 82 As
historian Earl Hayter writes, farmers were “threatened and harassed by royalty collectors on such
articles as sliding gates, barbed wire, clover hullers, harvesters, seeders, plows, drivewells, and others
too numerous to mention.” 83 Royalty agents worked on behalf of the inventors and at times deluged
farmers with multiple collectors over the same device, making them wary about adopting
technologies. 84 During a parallel period in the railroad industry, around the 1880s, the rapid
development of the railroad agency led “avaricious patent agents” to buy up patents and then use
them to sue the entire industry. 85 Then-Senator Christiancy complained to Congress about “patentsharks [who] . . . procure an assignment of . . . [a] useless patent, and at once proceed to levy blackmail
. . . upon any man who has ever manufactured or sold, or even used, the later and valuable invention.” 86
Though these transactions predated the rise of digital technology, Serrano’s study of
patent reassignments from 1980 to 2001 specifically considered the prevalence of patent transfers
among different industries. He found that patents in the computer and communications as well as the
76 For example, defensive patent aggregators likmarcoe RPX who may buy a patent in order to remove the threat from
its member companies.
77 Some might argue that even such transfers as these? that? may have positive welfare effects, insofar as liability transfers
reduce the need for litigation, and a patent, even if wrongfully issued, induce socially valuable racing.
78 Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology in the Late Nineteenth and Early
Twentieth Centuries (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Historical Working Paper No. h0098, 1997).
79 Id. at 22-24.
80 Id. at Table 1.6.
81 For an overview of these chapters in the history of the agrarian and railroad industries, see Colleen V. Chien, Reforming
Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325 (2012) (discussing the parallels between the historical and modern patent
controversies); Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 YALE L.J. 848 (2016).
82 See Earl W. Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent, 1875-1888, 34 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 59, 61 (1947).
83 Id. at 65.
84 Id.
85 STEVEN W. USSELMAN, REGULATING RAILROAD INNOVATION: BUSINESS, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS
IN AMERICA, 1840-1920, 115-17 (2004) (describing the activities of patent dealers Chittenden and Sayles who bought up
patents and sued a whole industry based on them in particular).
86 8 CONG. REC. 307-08 (1879) (statement of Sen. Christiancy).
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drug and medical industries had the highest likelihood of being transferred during their lifetime, about
13.5 percent. 87 In late 2015, the USPTO’s Chief Economist Office released the “USPTO Patent
Assignment Dataset,” a database covering approximately 6 million assignments and other transactions
recorded from 1970 to 2014. 88 According to these records, recent patents 89 are more likely to be
transferred than patents from earlier decades, the growth led in particular by the transfer of patents in
the computers and communications sectors. 90 Graham and his co-authors find, based on analyzing
this data, a yearly churn rate of 4.5% in 2014, as compared to Serrano’s lifetime transfer rate of 13.5%.
However, differences in the methodology between Graham et al. and Serrano probably explain the
discrepancy between these numbers.
Because these studies were based solely on patent records, neither probed the motives for or
conditions of patent transfers. However, a pair of studies have looked specifically at the relationship
between transfer and litigation. While both studies find, on average, that the transfer of patents reduces
litigation risk, 91 Galasso and his coauthors also find that patents traded to smaller entities were
associated with a greater chance of litigation. 92 Sales from larger companies to smaller NPEs 93 fit this
trend.
In contrast with data about patent sales, which are routinely publicly recorded, public
data about patent licenses are harder to come by. 94 There are no requirements to record, and licensing
data, even when it involves publicly funded patents, 95 is regarded as highly sensitive. 96 Surveys estimate
that about 10 percent of patents are licensed, 97 but that the extent of licensing depends on the entity

87 Serrano, supra note ___, at ___.
88 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2696147,
89
Patent issued since 2000-2005
90 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2696147, 18.
91 Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation supra note ___ ; Alberto Galasso, Mark Schankerman, and Carolos Serrano, Trading and
Enforcing Patent Rights, 44 RAND J. ECON. 275 (2013).
92 Galasso et al., supra note __, at 34.
93 Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 485-88 (2012) (finding, based on studying 347 patents,
that 243 were initially assigned to a company, and “more than 75% of these companies were corporations while the
remainder were LLCs and limited partnerships”).
94 See Iain M. Cockburn, Is the Market for Technology Working? Obstacles to Licensing Inventions, and Ways to Reduce Them 6-7,
Conference
on
Economics
of
Technology
Policy,
Monte
Verità
(2007),
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~charlesw/s591/Bocconi-Duke/Bocconi/S2_2008_02_11_MFT/Cockburn__Is_the_Market_for_Technology_Working.pdf (describing these difficulties).
95 Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat, Accountability in Patenting of Federally Funded Research, 30 NATURE BIOTECH. 953 (Oct.
2012).
96 As a result, studies generally rely on proprietary databases. See, e.g., Bharat N. Anand & Tarun Khanna, The Structure of
Licensing Contracts, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 103, 115 (2000), and Joshua S. Gans et al., The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property
Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays, 54 MGMT. SCI. 982 (2008),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13234.pdf (analyzing a sample of 200 licenses announced between 1990 and 1999 in the
Security Data Corporation database) (analyzing 1612 patents from the Strategic Alliance database of Securities Data
Company).
97 Harhoff, supra note ___ at __ (summarizing surveys by Motohashi (2008), Nagaoka and Kwon (2006), and Gambardella
et al., (2007)).
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size. 98 The empirical studies of licensing that do exist, generally conducted by economists, focus on
the prices 99 and strategies behind licensing. 100
3. Naked Patent Licenses v. Licenses for Know-How
One proxy for whether patent licensing supports technology transfers or liability
transfers is the extent to which licenses provide only patent rights as opposed to patent rights with
know-how. Patent licenses that include knowledge, know-how, personnel, or joint venture
relationships are more likely to represent direct transfers of technology, whereas the transfer of
“naked” patent rights is more likely to represent a change to the balance of liability between the parties.
Which type of patent license is more prevalent? The answer varies considerably based on context.
Varner’s study of 1,458 patent licenses, including patent assignments, included as exhibits in filings to
the SEC found that 56% of patent agreements included know-how, while 33% were “bare patent”
transfers and 11% were patent assignments, 101 consistent with earlier and smaller samples. 102 These
proportions were roughly consistent across the industries he considered, including “high-tech.” 103 But
when Feldman and Lemley surveyed those who had received licensing demands, they found the
opposite: that in the overwhelming majority of cases, the subsequent license was not accompanied by
the transfer of knowledge, know-how, personnel, joint venture relationships, or other indicia of
technology transfer. 104 Like Varner’s study, the Berkeley Patent Survey presents a mixed view, based
on surveying over 1,300 startups in mid-2000. Among venture-backed software startups, 12% licensed
in technology. 105 About 70% of them did so to gain knowledge, technology, or know-how while
approximately a quarter of firms did so only to avoid a dispute, and not to gain technology. 106 A quarter
of software startups, and 67% of venture-backed startups overall had patents. 107

98 Paola Giuri et al., Everything You Always Wanted To Know About Inventors (But Never Asked): Evidence From the Patval-EU
Survey,
MUNICH
SCH.
MGMT.,
UNIV.
MUNICH
(2006),
https://epub.ub.unimuenchen.de/1261/1/LMU_WP_2006_11.pdf [need parenthetical].
99 See, e.g., GREGORY J. BATTERSBY & CHARLES GRIMES, LICENSING ROYALTY RATES (2015 ed. 2014); Deepak
Hedge, Essays on Institutions and Innovation (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley),
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0sp3n4sk; Jonathan E. Kemmerer & Jiaging Lu, Profitability and Royalty Rates Across
Industries: Some Preliminary Evidence, KPMG GLOBAL VALUATION INSTITUTE (Nov. 19, 2012), https://www. kpmg
.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/gvi-profitability-v6.pdf.
100 See, e.g., Goretti Cabaleiro Cervino, Firm Strategies Behind the Establishment of Licensing Agreements (2014) (unpublished
Ph.D.
dissertation,
University
of
Madrid),
http://earchivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/18988/goretti_cabaleiro_tesis.pdf?sequence=1.
101 Thomas R. Varner, An Economic Perspective on Patent Licensing Structure and Provisions, 46 BUS. ECON. 229, 232 (2011).
102 Victor Braun, Licenses as Critical Sources of Innovation, 43 LES NOUVELLES 225, 226 (2008) (“Contractor (1985) found
that in the early 1980s 75 percent of U.S. license agreements contained know-how transfers. Vickery (1988) in a Les survey
of 119 international licensing transactions detected 67 percent. In the Chemical Industry, all but the simplest licenses
involve a mixture of patents and know-how.”).
103 Varner, note __ at Table 1. The “high-tech” category included: Computer Software, Computer Hardware, Electronic
Components, Instrumentation, and Telecommunication firms.
104 Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137, Fig. 5-28
(Feb. 15, 2015).
105 Graham et al., supra note __ at 1318.
106 Id. at ___.
107 Id. at ___.
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4. Exclusivity Provisions
Another view of the ways in which patents support the market for technology can be
achieved by looking at the extent to which the terms of the license mirror the terms of the patent. An
exclusive license lets the licensee, with the right to exclude conferred by the patent, to “step into the
shoes” of the patentholder with the exclusive right to commercialize the invention. A cross-license,
on the other hand, represents the exchange of permissions to practice the technology – one that
promotes freedom to operate but, on balance, does not necessarily lead to more technology being
transferred than otherwise would have in the absence of patents on both sides. Non-exclusive licenses
can certainly transfer technologies in a way that questions the need for a patent to incent ex post
commercialization, though it does not necessarily undermine ex ante incentives to invent. 108
A number of studies have looked at the level of exclusivity present in patent licenses,
again with mixed results. Anand and Khanna’s study of licensing deals involving at least one US
participant between 1990 and 1993 reported that more than 30 percent of the 1612 deals involved
exclusive licenses. 109 However, there were strong industry differences. Only 15% of “electronic”
company licenses were exclusive, while over 50% of "chemical" company licenses were. 110 But
electronic industry licenses (20%) were twice as likely to be cross-licenses as chemical licenses (10%). 111
A number of studies have also found a relatively higher level of exclusive licenses among university
and biotechnology patents. In their review of 1,715 patents developed at the University of California
and the Department of Energy National Laboratories between 1977 and 2009, Drivas and his
colleagues found that the overwhelming majority were exclusively licensed. 112 In a parallel study of
university patents covering DNA published in 2006, Pressman found that exclusivity provisions varied
by licensee size. The smaller the company, the more likely the license was exclusive. 113
In sum, while existing studies of patent sales and licenses provide a glimpse of the role
of patent transactions, sometimes big, sometimes small, in innovation, they raise just as many
questions as they answer in the context of the central issue of whether software is “eating the world”
despite, because of, hindered or helped by software patents. Serrano and his colleagues have
demonstrated that patent sales have been happening to a considerable degree, reducing litigation risk
except when sales to larger entities are made. However, his study, which ends in 2000 transactions,
predates many of the major developments in the software patent law as well as the software
marketplace. 114 It also doesn’t focus on software patents. The same is true of all of the existing studies
of patent license terms. The Khanna and Anand study, which comes closest, studies licenses that are
over two decades old. Given the importance of software innovation, it is worth building upon what is
known by focusing specifically on software patents, software companies, and software sales and
licenses. The rest of this study uses several sources to attempt to do this, with a focus on two main
questions:
How robust is the paid market for software innovation, when measured through the lens of
software patent sales and software licenses?
108 I thank John Duffy for pointing out this distinction to me.
109 Anand & Khanna, supra note ___ at 109.
110 Id. at Table III(i).
111 Id.
112 Kyriakos Drivas et al., Academic Patent Licenses: Roadblocks or Signposts for Nonlicensee Cumulative Innovation?, SOC. SCI.
RES. NETWORK 9 (Aug. 29, 2014).
113 Lori Pressman et al., The Licensing of DNA Patents by US Academic Institutions: An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE
BIOTECH. 31 (2006).
114 As described, e.g., in the FTC’s Report, supra note ___.
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To what extent are the licensing and sale of software patents facilitating the transfer of technology
as opposed to legal liability, based on looking at the ways in which patents are being redistributed?
The next section outlines the methods, sources, and assumptions used, and the following section,
outlines my main findings.
III.

PART II: DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

To explore the market for software innovation and the role of patents in supporting this market,
I drew upon several novel sources of data. Despite the recent growth in empirical patent scholarship,
law academics have generally paid less attention to markets for technology for several reasons. First,
data on patent transactions has been actually or practically inaccessible or in an un-useable form,
including for the reasons described below. In addition, patent scholars have generally paid less
attention to the use of patents for commercialization, signaling, and financing purposes, which these
data sources reflect, and more attention to the pursuit and litigation of patents, consistent with the
Constitutional idea of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts, by rewarding innovators
for their innovative ideas, in order to “fuel the fire of genius,” 115 and give them the opportunity to
exclude others from the marketplace. 116
Recent developments have both highlighted the importance of considering the “middle layer” of
patent transactions, and chipped away at obstacles to studying it. The high profile purchases of patents
by Apple and Google described earlier drew attention to the importance of patents and the freedom
to operate. At the same time, the Obama Administration’s commitment to “open data” and decision
to treat government-generated data as public assets has led to the opening of hundreds of thousands
of government datasets 117 These datasets drive government accountability and transparency, spawn
new businesses, and support existing ones. 118 Thus, though one of the two enumerated duties of the
USPTO is to “be responsible for disseminating to the public information with respect to patents and
trademarks,” 119 only in the last 10 years, in concert with the creation of the Office of Chief Economist,
has the agency engaged in the release of large quantities of patent data in digital form, detailing not
only the details of patent prosecution, but ownership and other events that occur over a patent’s
lifetime. 120 These developments have been a boon to the more than 135 patent data companies121 that
exploit the application of machine learning and artificial intelligence techniques to code, clean, and
ultimately, transform raw open government data on the application, maintenance, licensing,
securitization, and sale of patents, as leveraged in this analysis into useable insights. As highlighted
earlier, the importance of the market for patents and technology, the range of non-exclusionary uses
of patents, and our understanding of these developments has grown in recent years. Thus, in addition
115
Lecture
on
Discoveries
and
Innovation,
ABRAHAM
LINCOLN
ONLINE
(2016),
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/discoveries.htm.
116 See discussion of U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 above.
117 See, e.g., Data.gov. These datasets pertain to everything from disaster relief, to information about Medicare and
Medicaid services, to sexual assaults on campuses. See id. and Case Studies of US Open Data, and Open Data Community Events,
listed at https://project-open-data.cio.gov/.
118 Project Open Data, https://project-open-data.cio.gov/.
119 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2) (2012).
120 Before these releases, the USPTO would provide certain data upon request but charge fees in the thousands to get it.
In 2010, the USPTO, in partnership with Google, released a large amount of transactional data about patents and TM,
including grants, assignments, and maintenance fees, publicly available for free. Described in Colleen V. Chien, Predicting
Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 300 n.110 (2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911579&.
121 Referred to in Colleen V. Chien & Brian J. Love, Comment to the USPTO on Quality Case Studies, 1 (Feb. 2016),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/casestudies_f_chien%26love_12feb2016.pdf.
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to the development of the “supply” of patent data, the “demand” for this data, as companies seek
technology and financing partners, has also grown.
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IDENTIFYING “SOFTWARE” AGREEMENTS AND PATENTS
In order to explore the importance of software licenses and the role of patents in supporting
software innovation, I had to identify “software” companies, “software” licenses, and “software”
patents, well-known to be challenging tasks. Previous researchers have developed several approaches
for identifying software patents: keyword searching (i.e. for “computer program” or “software”) 122
and, patent classification 123 filtering (i.e. for classes G06F “Electrical Digital Data Processing” or G06F
“Recognition Of Data; Presentation Of Data; Record Carriers; Handling Record Carriers”). 124 To find
“pure” software companies, Graham et al., has selected companies falling within several SIC codes. 125
In this work, I relied on all three approaches - keyword searching (and keyword coding) to identify
software agreements, Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC”) codes to identify pure software
companies, and patent class codes to identify software patents. Given the broad distribution of
software innovation, 126 it is likely that the classification-based identification techniques we used
underestimate the scope of software patents and companies in which software innovation is occurring.
I therefore proceed with caution, using these measures as a basis for performing and reporting relative
trends and prevalence, rather than considering them to represent comprehensive measures of software
innovation.
DATA SOURCES
To understand the market for software innovation through the lens of software licenses and
software patent sales, I relied primarily on two proprietary databases: the ktMine database of material
technology licenses reported to the SEC, and the Innography database of patent transfers. Though
populated with open government data, each database is proprietary, introducing several limitations to
this study. First, their use precludes the release of the underlying data I analyzed and complicates
replication efforts. Second, the databases themselves contain known coverage gaps, for example, of
unrecorded transactions and transactions involving patent applications that were abandoned prior to
publication. However, even more problematically, they may include unknown gaps or otherwise be
incomplete, biasing the data in unknown ways. Third, reliance on the coding of others subjects the
analysis to the risk that the coding contains errors or may be incorrectly interpreted. I took several
measures to minimize the impact of these defects. First, I describe in the paper what we know about
the databases and along the way, carried out confirmatory checks using our independent coding. I
also, to the degree permitted under license agreement, provide information about the search
approaches I used. In addition to using raw open government data, I relied upon additional codings
supplied by the providers, as described in greater detail below. To avoid interpretational errors with
respect to these codings, I conferred closely with each provider regarding their data sources and
122 James Bessen & Robert Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 157 (2007).
123 Based on the CPC and IPC schemes.
124 Stuart Graham & David Mowery, Intellectual Property Protection in the U.S. Software Industry, in PATENTS IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
125 SIC Codes 7371, 7372,7373, 7379,. See Stuart J. H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1269 (2009).
126
See Branstetter, supra note ___.
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methodology and carried out independent confirmatory codings in a number of cases to ensure that
my understanding was correct.
1. Patent Sales Data
Although there is no obligation to publicly record ownership or transfers of patent rights, doing
so provides legal rights against those who might attempt to later purchase the patent. 127 However, the
task of identifying what patents have been sold, to whom, and under what terms, has been complicated
by the large variety of recordable “conveyances” of patent rights, including securitizations, licenses,
intra-company transfers of patents, and merger and acquisition-based transfers. 128 As a result, the task
of separating “true transfers” of a patent from other types of conveyances presents a significant
obstacle to doing research on the patent market. About 10% of conveyances recorded at the USPTO
represent true inter-company transfers. 129
In related work, Esmail Khaksari and I co-authored a study at Innography relying upon searches
involving “true transfers” 130 of software patents 131 that had been recorded at the USPTO between
2012 and 2015. We drew upon Innography’s “PMT” database, which is comprised of conveyance data
that has been cleansed and processed so that only true, inter-company transfers outside of the context
of the merger or acquisition are left. 132 We found 30,898 reassignments of software patents from
January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2015, some involving the same patent, together representing the
transfer of 25,210 unique patents. To determine the rate at which patents were being transferred, we
had to estimate the universe of possibly transferable patents. We included any patent in force during
the period of transfer in this denominator (N= 433,430). 133
2. “Significant” Software Technology Licenses
Although license data is generally not available, 134 publicly traded companies are required by SEC
regulations to report in their filings, “material definitive agreements not made in the ordinary course

127 Alicia Griffin Mills, Perfecting Security Interests in IP: Avoiding the Traps, 125 BANKING L.J. 746 (2008).
128 Form PTO-1595, the “Recordation Form Cover Sheet” enables recordation of 8 different types of conveyances,
including “Other.” See http://www.uspto.gov/forms/pto1595.pdf. Discussed in Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent
Litigation at footnote ___.
129 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2696147, Figure 7; Accord Patent Market Tracker: Fall 2015 Key
Trends, INNOGRAPHY, INC. (2016), https://www.innography.com/public/upload/files/general-files/InnographyPatent-Market-Tracker.pdf (accessed on October 15, 2015). (estimating the share of conveyances that are interfirm
assignments to be 15%)
130 See Colleen V. Chien & Esmaeil Khaksari, The Patent Marketplace 2012-2015, forthcoming, from which all original
research on transfers reported in this article is drawn, for more details about the PMT tool and how it is constructed.
131 As defined by Graham & Mowery’s CPC-based classification. Described supra at note ____.
132 Because of the way that transfers are evaluated, the PMT excludes patent transfers that follow acquisitions of
companies where the child is merged into the parent entity. However, transfers that support spin-outs or transfers to
entities that are distinct from the original patentholders are still included.
133 To determine which assets were in force, we used actual and projected expirations dates of the patent which are
estimated by Innography by taking into account patent type, priority date, patent term adjustments, abandonments, and
maintenance activities, but which do not include terminal disclaimers. See http://education.innography.com/overviewpatent.
134 The lack of public data about technology licenses is a well-known impediment to research in this area. While
technology and the permissions to use it are routinely exchanged in return for money or other consideration, there is no
requirement that licensing transactions be publicly recorded. Even when one party might be willing to disclose what they
paid or what they were paid, or other terms of the agreement, non-disclosure agreements typically prevent the divulgence
of license details, even selectively. See, e.g., discussion in Anne Kelley, Practicing in the Patent Marketplace, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
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of business.” 135 While I refer collectively in this article to these publicly filed agreements as the “SEC
Database,” in fact, there is no central repository of such agreements or easy way of identification in
the SEC record, due to the lack of designation of such licenses and the non-standard ways in which
agreements are formed and referred to by parties. 136 Although this study was able to leverage the
aggregation, cleaning, and coding of these licenses by the proprietary vendor kTMine, SEC license
data has several structural limitations that are worth discussing upfront. First, in contrast to public
records about patent sales, which trigger protections against subsequent purchases of a patent by any
transactor, only a small subset of agreements triggers SEC reporting requirements – agreements that
are material to a public company, which, in turn, comprise only a small subset of all companies. As
such SEC licenses are surely not representative of agreements in general, 137 but rather agreements that
survive two significant filters: they are relevant to a publicly traded company, and substantial enough
to be considered material. As a result, these agreements are not representative of commercial
technology licenses in general but are biased towards larger, rather than smaller agreements, and
reporting by smaller, rather than larger firms, as observed in our own data as reported at FIG ___.
I used ktMine’s licensing database, which includes over 100,000 material agreements, collected
from public sources, primarily the SEC Database, and performed my analysis using ktMine’s “Royalty
Rate Analyzer” tool, which contains about 16,000 IP license agreements with royalty terms, a subset
of the total. 138 I relied upon ktMine’s coding of basic facts about each agreement including the
licensor, licensee, effective date of the license, industry of the agreement, agreement type, 139 and
keywords, indicating the subject matter of the license. 140
In order to focus on agreements that affect the diffusion of technology between firms, I excluded
certain types of agreements such as asset purchases (typically, associated with M&A activity),
marketing, distribution, and services agreements. The “technology agreements” 141 I found comprised
about 20-25% of all agreements, and I focused my analysis on the subset of licenses with an effective
date of 2000 through 2015 (N=6,109). I chose these effective dates in order to capture recent trends
in licensing. However, due to lags between the execution and recordation of licenses, the dataset has
relatively fewer licenses from recent years compared with older years.

115, 117 (2011), and Jorge L. Contreras et al., Study Proposal- Commercial Patent Licensing Data (University of Utah College
of Law, Research Paper No. 164, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755706.
135 SEC Form 8-K, Current Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Item 1.01,
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf.
136 As Ian Cockburn has described, "license agreements are typically complex, contingent contracts, they are difficult to
value or assess, or even count up for statistical purposes. Very few—if any—national statistical agencies collect
comprehensive data on technology licensing activity, and the coverage, accuracy and content of databases sold by private
vendors is very difficult to assess independently.” A cottage industry of companies that harvest, collect, clean, and code
this data addresses this gap, including RECAP, RoyaltyStat, Biosciences Advisers, and ktMine.
137 See, e.g., Tom Varner, An Economic Perspective on Patent Licensing Structure and Provisions (2011) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author), who compared SEC licenses he reviewed to other agreements that he reviewed in the course of expert
witness and other work he did, finding the undisclosed agreements “to include a greater percentage of cross-licenses,
royalty-free licenses, and fixed fee licenses than observed in the dataset analyzed for this paper.”
138
BVR/ktMine,
Royalty
Rate
Benchmarking
Guide
2015/2016
Global
Edition,
5
(2015),
http://www.bvresources.com/pdfs/RoyaltyRateGuide_2015_Excerpt.pdf.
139 As described in footnote ___.
140 BVR/ktMine, as described in footnote ___, correspondence with ktMine on file with the author.
141 We included the following agreements types in this category: cross-licenses, joint development,
manufacturing/process intangible, other, and software. We excluded asset purchases, distribution, franchise, marketing
intangible, and service agreements from our analysis.
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Within this group of technology agreements, I focused on “software” technology agreements, as
coded by ktMine, yielding 1,431 licenses. I read many of these licenses to confirm that they were,
indeed, about software, and, replicating Bessen and Meurer’s keyword identification approach, 142
found a roughly equivalent number of agreements (1,451). Within software technology licenses, I
distinguished between agreements in which patents were mentioned (N=1,163) and those where
copyrights, trade secrets, trademarks, patents, or software source code 143 were coded as “core” by
kTMine to the agreement. Based on their methodology, patents were core to 480 of the software
technology agreements, which included both technology licenses and asset transfers. I worked with
research assistants to code the provisions of software agreements where patent rights were also
transferred not in the context of an asset transfer (N=245).
To establish a baseline from which to evaluate the prevalence of licenses, we took several steps.
We looked at the prevalence of reporting among “pure software” firms as defined by Graham and his
colleagues that were eligible to report licenses over the studied period. These firms fell into three SIC
codes: prepackaged software firms such as Microsoft, IBM, and Adobe Systems Inc. (SIC 7372), 144
computer integrated systems design firms like Fujitsu, and Mentor Graphics Corp. (SIC 7373), 145 and
companies that provide computer programming services like Sabre Corporation or General Dynamics
Information Technology (SIC 7371). 146
Because companies are routinely listed and delisted from public exchanges, at times within the
span of just a few years, taking a single year snapshot does not yield an accurate count of the universe
of companies eligible to file material agreements. Therefore, we next used COMPUSTAT to generate
an aggregate list of companies within the relevant SIC codes in each of five years (2000, 2004, 2008,
2012, and 2014). Out the five-year period, there were 1,140 unique public “pure software” companies
within COMPUSTAT. We further pulled revenue from the year of the agreement so that we could
determine the prevalence of reporting among different revenue bands. For companies with reported
revenue, this approach had the advantage of being available for multiple years, including the effective
year of the relevant transaction, for most but not all companies. 147
3. Company and Revenue Data
I worked with research assistants to integrate several types of company- and industry-level data
into our analysis including revenue, age of founding, and SIC code. To profile public companies in
our analysis, we relied primarily on COMPUSTAT and SEC filings. For private firms, we used
ReferenceUSA and company websites to determine year of founding. We excluded transactions with
individuals from our analysis, as well as transactions involving firms, including all private and many
foreign public ones, for which we could not find founding year or revenue data, resulting in a match
for about 45% of transactions.
142 To find agreements that included the term “software” or “computer program,” as described in Bessen & Meurer,
Patent Failure, supra note ___.
143 For each, I worked with kTMine to identify the relevant agreements, based on an exhaustive list of keywords covering
each concept.
144 SIC 7372 Prepackaged Software, ADVAMEG, INC.: REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS (2016),
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/industries/Service/Prepackaged-Software.html#ixzz49IsPLPkO.
145 SIC 7373 Computer Integrated Systems Design, ADVAMEG, INC.: REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS (2016),
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/industries/Service/Computer-Integrated-Systems-Design.html#ixzz49ItBM6j6.
146
Business
List
SIC
7371
Computer
Programming
Services,
SICCODE.COM
(2016),
http://siccode.com/en/codes/sic/7371/computer-programming-services.
147 COMPUSTAT data is not uniformly available for all publicly listed companies. When data from the particular year
that the license was reported was not available, we chose the closest year.

21

IV.

PART III: FINDINGS
THE MARKET FOR SOFTWARE PATENTS IS ROBUST AND GROWING, DESPITE A DECLINE IN THE
ENFORCEABILITY OF CERTAIN SOFTWARE PATENTS.

The first finding of this study pertains to the importance of the marketplace for diffusing software
innovation between firms. Studying the market addresses several gaps in our understanding of
software innovation. First, although most of the policy attention with respect to software patents has
been focused on disputes about their quality, patterns of assertion, and infringement, the sales and
licensing of software patents provide more direct insights into the transactional role software patents
are playing, on a day to day basis, in stimulating and supporting innovation, or not.
Second, while much has been written about open modes of diffusing software innovation across
firms borders, for example through employment laws and policies that do not allow for the
enforcement of non-competes 148 or the open source software movement, 149 the paid market for
software innovation as reflected in software patent licenses and sales represents a sizeable and
important mechanism for technology transfer. Understanding the dynamic between open and
proprietary innovation is an important step in ensuring adequate support for both models.
Finally, while there have been a number of significant policy developments in the realm of software
patents in the past few years, their impact on software innovation has not been clear. In general,
software patents have become harder to enforce in recent years. The America Invents Act of 2011
introduced a host of new procedures to challenge the validity of issued patents. 150 These procedures
have not been kind to software patents. 151 The Supreme Court’s Alice decision in 2014 erected
significant limits to patentable subject matter, making it harder to get patents over business methods
and the abstract algorithms that are at the heart of software innovation. 152 Almost immediately,
defendants began mounting “Alice” challenges to patents they were sued on, invalidating them in
many cases. 153 Holding all else equal, these developments would be expected to depress the market
for software patents.

148 Described, e.g., in ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS,
RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING (2013).
149 For an overview of the open source software movement, see Karim R. Lakhani & Eric von Hippel, How Open Source
Software Works: “Free” User-to-User Assistance, 32 RES. POLICY 923 (2003).
150 These include inter partes review (IPR), the covered business method transitional program (CBM) and post-grant
review (PGR). See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B. J. 539
(2012) for an overview of the rationale and features of these procedures).
151 Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE
93, 105–06 (2014) (finding petitions for inter partes review result in elimination of every challenged claim about twice as
often as the same result for requests for inter partes reexamination).
152 See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014).
153 Jasper L. Tran, Software Patents: A One-Year Review of Alice v. CLS Bank, 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 532,
540–41 (2015) (showing the district courts, PTAB, and the Federal Circuit invalidated 82.9% of patent applications in the
year following Alice).
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1. Patent Sales
Against this backdrop, the data tells a distinct story. The paid market for software innovation is
robust: in a single year, the data show, a software patent is as or more likely to be sold (~2%) than it
is to be litigated over its entire lifetime. 154 Rather than declining, the absolute number of software
patent transfers has actually increased, from around 5.9K patents per year in 2012 to 8.9K patents per
year in 2015, a 68% rise. (FIG____)
FIG___ : The Sale of US Software (and Biotech) Patents (2012-2015) 155

To put these findings in context and explore the possibility that this rate of increase reflects
changes in the number of patents or other changes outside the patent system, we considered not only
the absolute number of patents being transferred, but the relative rate of software patent transfer, as
compared to the total number of in-force patents. We also compared software patent and
biotechnology patent transfer rates. 156 These calculations reinforce the robustness of the software
patent market — reflecting a rise in the transfer rate from 1.4% in 2012 to 2.4% in 2015, and far
outstripping the rate of biotechnology patent transfers, which totaled 0.8% to 1.6%. When we
compared the top transactions in both sectors, we saw that the size of the average portfolio of
transferred software patents was much larger than that of transferred biotechnology patents.
This finding is significant for at least two reasons — first, it reinforces that software patents are
actually much more likely to be transferred than litigated. Scholars and policymakers, in contrast, have
concentrated far more on the litigation of software patents than their transfer. The scholarly
154 It is estimated that 1-2% of all patents is ever litigated. See cites supra.
155 Calculated based on unique patents. We did not control for continuations, which may be more common among
biotech than software patents.
156 We chose the biotechnology industry as a point of comparison because the biotechnology sector is often held up as
an example of a well-functioning innovation market, in which larger firms are well-poised to commercialize and absorb
smaller firms or their technology and bring it to market.
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community should turn more attention to this set of patent transactions, and the dynamics between
sales and litigation. Second, the data show that the market for software patents remains robust, and
has even grown, in the face of significant legal developments calling into question the enforceability
of software patents. What accounts for this trend? Below I discuss three possible explanations.
a) Bargain Shopping for Software Patents
Although detailed transactional data is hard to come by, one reason for the uptick in patent
transactions may be that the price per patent has gone down. According to one estimate, 157 from 2014
to 2015, asking prices were down about ~$90K per patent, from $280K per asset to $190K per asset,
even as sales increased. 158 The increased sales volume may reflect opportunistic buying on the part of
those who want to decrease the risk of patent assertions and perceive a buying opportunity. In 2016,
the patent buying consortia IP3, representing IBM, Apple, Google, Microsoft and a number of the
other top targets of patent litigation announced that it would be soliciting offers to sell patents to the
consortia. 159 Building on an experiment to buy patents directly from patentholders carried out by
Google the previous year 160 and the efforts of defensive aggregating intermediaries, 161 the group is
exercising monopsony power to “buy in bulk.” This shift in purchasing strategy further reduces the
group members’ own costs and cuts out the middlemen of patent litigators and patent assertion entities
(PAEs). As the enforcement climate grows less favorable to patentholders, the option of monetizing
through direct sales rather than assertion may be attractive to both parties, even at lowered prices. In
addition, when companies have fixed budgets that they must spend on managing patent risks,
including the purchase of patents, and the market cost per patent declines, the volume of patents sold
must go up.
b) Defensive, not Offensive Acquisition of Portfolios of Software Patents of Software
Patents
Another driver of software patent transactions is the purchase of patents for defensive or strategic,
rather than offensive, purposes. Patents create freedom to operate in at least two ways. First, the
presence of an arsenal of patents, and closely related technology, deters attacks by competitors because
it enables the owner of the arsenal to bring a countersuit if threatened. Second, patents provide trading
chits that allow companies to exchange technology through cross-licensing. In both contexts, the
quantity of patents held in a portfolio is just as, if not more, important as the quality or enforceability
of any individual patent. Thus, while a single patent or group of patents might now appear to be invalid
under the Alice decision, it is likely that within an entire portfolio, there are still enforceable assets, and
the costs of determining the difference on a patent-by-patent basis is often prohibitive. Likewise, in a
license negotiation between two parties, even though one patent may be a strong candidate for
invalidation under an AIA procedure, challenging an entire patent portfolio, which may number in the
157 Richardson Oliver Law Group, Presentation to the IPBC in Barcelona, June 6, 2016 (presentation on file with the
author).
158 Id. (reporting a 23% increase in sales of all patents from 2014 to 2015, larger than the increase that we observed among
software patents during that period of time).
159 Richard Lloyd, The Timing is Perfect for IP3's Patent Buyers; For Sellers the Picture is Far Less Rosy, IAM MEDIA (May 20,
2016), http://www.iam-media.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=3cbec828-2e85-4746-b422-772e5f294aa4.
160 Id.
161 For example, RPX and Allied Security Trust (AST).
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hundreds, is impractical. Thus the decline in enforceability of individual patents has not necessarily
translated into a greater freedom to operate, meaning there is still a strong need for additional patent
assets. Several of these transactions that appear to be defensively motivated are explored further in
Part ___.
c) Software Eats the World
Finally, the value of a patent is a product not only of its legal validity, but the economic value of
the technology it covers. A patent that conforms to all the legal requirements of patentability but
covers a worthless technology has little value. Similarly, a portfolio of patents over a valuable
technology, even if the validity of some of the patents is contestable, can be worth millions. While the
legal enforceability of software patents has declined recently, there doesn’t appear to be any
corresponding decline in software innovation. 162 Growth in the US software sector has outpaced
overall economic growth over the past few decades. 163 Google and software company SAS are among
the best places to work in America, 164 and the stocks of software and internet companies like Netflix,
Electronic Arts, Activision, Amazon lead the stock market. 165 The market for software patents reflects
the vibrancy of the software industry to a greater degree than it does the legal enforceability of software
patents. In this sense, software innovation could be said to be happening not because of, but in spite
of or unrelated to, software patents.
2. Additional Evidence from Licenses
The importance of the market for software-based innovation can be gauged not only through sales
of software patents but also through agreements for software innovation. As described earlier, this
study considers technology agreements reported to the SEC by public companies that deem the
agreements to be “material” events that could impact the company’s stock price. As such, it is
important to keep in mind the limited nature of this sample, as it excludes many agreements to license
software innovation.
Keeping this caveat in mind, the SEC data supports the importance of software in technology
transactions among a variety of different industries. According to KTMine’s version of the SEC
database, about 23% of all technology agreements 166 reported to the SEC between 2000 and 2015
(1,431 out of 6,109) involved the transfer of software. 167 That is to say, nearly a quarter of important
technology agreements to public companies were software agreements. To put that number in context,
162
And in fact, software innovation is increasingly leading even in traditional, manufacturing sectors of the
economy, as discussed in Branstetter, supra note ____.
163 Robert J. Shapiro, The U.S. Software Industry as an Engine for Economic Growth and Employment, Sonecon 1, 7 (Sept. 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2541673 (finding that, from 1997 to 2012, growth of the software
industry outpaced growth in the rest of the economy, capturing an increasing share of national GDP, and contributing
3.2% of GDP in 2012).
164 See, e.g. 100 Best Companies to Work for, Fortune, http://fortune.com/best-companies/ (listing Google as the #1 top
place to work from 2014 to 2016 and SAS Institute among the top ten in that period).
165 https://www.thestreet.com/story/13306053/1/the-10-best-s-p-500-stocks-in-all-of-2015.html
166 As described above, these agreements include joint development, cross-license, manufacturing/intangibles
agreements, software agreements and other agreements, and exclude franchise, distribution, service, marketing, and asset
purchase agreements.
167 Based on KTMine’s designation of the agreement as a “software” agreement.
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software companies contributed about 3% to GDP in 2012. 168 That the share of software technology
transactions is greater than software’s contribution to GDP is unsurprising, but the extent of this
difference is dramatic.
a) The Distribution of Software Agreements
How were software agreements distributed, across and within industries? Innovation scholars have
long discussed the contrast between “cumulative” innovation areas like software, in which many, even
thousands, of incremental innovations may be embodied in a single product, and “discrete” biopharma
innovations, which may be covered by just a handful of patents. 169 The differences in these two types
of innovation have strained our unitary patent system, which does not permit discrimination based on
technology. 170 However, to the extent that cumulative, software-based innovation is widespread across
sectors, these distinctions may be blurring.
From 2000 to 2015, this study finds, material software agreements were spread among a variety
of different technology areas, with the largest numbers of agreements covering business services,
internet, telecommunications, and health care technologies. (See Appendix, XFIG. ___) The broad
distribution of software agreements further demonstrates that software innovation is not restricted to
certain sectors, but is shaping our economy more generally. 171
What about the distribution of agreements within industries? The data discussed thus far, about
the number of technology agreements, and the share of them that are software agreements, do not
measure the likelihood that any individual company is to enter into a material agreement covering
software. To measure this, we looked specifically at “pure” software companies and the extent to
which they did or did not report material software agreements. We found that a modest share of all
public companies, 172 around 9%, had reported one or more software agreements. (FIG. __) The
smaller a company was, the more likely it was to have reported an agreement.
FIG___ Share of Pure Software Companies (by Annual Revenue Band) Reporting a Material
Technology Agreement to the SEC (2000-2015)

168 Shapiro, supra note __ at 17–18 (finding that, from 1997 to 2012, growth of the software industry outpaced growth in
the rest of the economy, capturing an increasing share of national GDP, and contributing 3.2% of GDP in 2012).
169 See, e.g. Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions
and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not), (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000).
170
TRIPS Article ___ [email me for citation or look for “non-discrimination principle - TRIPS]
171 As discussed in Branstetter, supra note ___, at____.
172 Tracked by COMPUSTAT

26

While the findings described above provide some basic facts about the likelihood, prevalence, and
distribution of paid transfers of software innovation, they do not address the substance of these
transfers. When a software patent is transferred from one firm to another, what is sold, exactly? When
a company signs an agreement to share software innovation with another, what exactly is it sharing,
and on what terms? These questions are important to address as not all transfers of software
innovation are created equal, nor do they confer the same social costs and benefits. In the following
paragraphs, I consider patterns of patent sales, as well as SEC reported patent licenses, addressing
where possible the extent to which the transfer or license represents a transfer of technology or a
transfer of liability.
SOFTWARE PATENTS ARE MOSTLY BEING TRANSFERRED FROM LARGE TO SMALL, AND
OLDER TO YOUNGER COMPANIES, TO SUPPORT TECHNOLOGY AND LIABILITY TRANSFERS
When Google bought Motorola in 2011, it was primarily for its ability to protect the Android
ecosystem, 173 but the transaction was unusual — typically when a company buys another, it is in order
to buy the business, including the technology and innovation that may be protected by patent. But the
wide variety of ways in which patents be used, including for protection (freedom to operate), signaling,
trading, or protecting the underlying technology through exclusion 174 gives rise to a wide variety of
motivations for patent sale. One way to discern the purpose of sale is to look at its terms and
downstream uses. The pattern of a transfer may also reveal the motives of the buyer, in particular with
respect to the relative ages of the parties. For example, patents can support the sale of the technology
of a young company to an older company better positioned to commercialize the technology, helped
173 https://www.google.com/press/motorola/
174 See, e.g. Stephen Yelderman, Coordination-Focused Patent Policy, 96 B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2481025, for an overview of these uses.
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by intermediaries. 175 Conversely, patents may be transferred from an older to a younger company
when the younger company is infringing the patent and seeks freedom from suit, or a unit of the older
company is divested to a younger company.
Although the terms of patent sales are generally not publicized, information about large
transactions is often available, and we probe such transactions set in the first step of our inquiry.
FIG.___ lists the top ten sales of software patents (by number of patents) recorded from 2012 through
2015. Reviewing public disclosures about each “top transaction,” about half appear to have been
associated with defensive, or otherwise liability-shifting motivations, while the remainder supported
the broader transfer of a technology business. Strikingly, in all of the transactions, assets moved from
an older to a younger company. Once we identified this pattern, we probed whether it held among
transfers for which information was available. We found that it did, with software patents between
two and three times more likely to be transferred from an older to a younger company than vice versa.
This finding contrasts sharply with the commercialization story of patents in which a young upstart
sells its patents to an established incumbent, as further discussed below. The results were robust across
every year studied and both individual patent transfers and transactions. We also found that the skew
in favor of “old to young” transfers was much more pronounced among software patent transfers
than biotechnology patent transfers. We begin with our analysis of the top ten transfers, as listed in
FIG.___.

175 See e.g. James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent
Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190 (2006), and cites in Feldman and Lemley, supra note___ note 7.
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FIG. ____: Top 10 Software Patent Transfers (2012-215) and
Years of Founding of Transferors and Transferees

Transaction

IBM to Globalfoundries Inc.
HP Inc. to TCL Corporation

Lenovo Group to Alphabet Inc.

Fujitsu and Panasonic to Socionext
IBM to Lenovo Group
HP to Qualcomm
IBM to LinkedIn
IBM to Twitter

IBM to Facebook

Eastman Kodak to Intellectual
Ventures Management

Software Patents
Transferred 176

Year of founding of
Transferor

834

1984

2240
1123
820
783
599
516
495
414
310

1911
1939

Fujitsu: 1935;
Panasonic: 1918
1911
1934
1911
1911
1911
1888

Year of founding
of Transferee
2009
1981
1998
2015
1984
1985
2002
2006
2004
2000

1. Transferring Liability

One of the most striking things about the list of top ten software patent transfers is that five
involve the transfer of patents from IBM to other companies. For years, IBM has been the top
recipient of US patents, so its dominance of the top of the seller list isn’t necessarily surprising. Three
of the five transactions of IBM patents, to the young technology companies of LinkedIn, Twitter, and
Facebook appeared to fit the profile of “liability” rather than “technology” transfers. In 2013, IBM
reportedly sent a letter to Twitter claiming that it was infringing several of IBM's patents and invited
the company to “sort it out or face the consequences.” 177 Practicing a well-known tactic, 178 IBM
approached Twitter during one of its most vulnerable times, when it was trying to go public. 179
Ultimately, Twittter bought many more patents, perhaps as many as nine hundred, than the handful
that it was alleged to be infringing. 180 This suggests that Twitter thought it would be useful to have
176

It is worth noting that these counts reflect only the transfer of software patents, and the actual transactions may
have also encompassed non-software patents.
177 Brid-Aine Parnell, Twitter Avoids IP Face-off with Big Blue, Will Buy 900 IBM Patents, THE REGISTER (Feb. 3, 2014),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/02/03/twitter_ibm_patents/.
178 As documented, for example, in Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Patent Demands and Initial Public Offerings, 19 Stan.
Tech. L. Rev. 52, 73–79 (2015) (finding the percentage of companies surveyed with patent claims filed against them jumped
from 10% before S-1 filing to 40% shortly before or after the IPO).
179 Brid-Aine Parnell, Twitter Avoids IP Face-off with Big Blue, Will Buy 900 IBM Patents, THE REGISTER (Feb. 3, 2014),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/02/03/twitter_ibm_patents/.
180 Parnell, supra note __.
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not only freedom from the patents specifically asserted against it, but also assets that it could use to
ward off other threats. According to reports, prospective litigation also led Facebook to acquire at
least 400 patents from IBM. 181 (FIG ___). LinkedIn’s purchase of IBM patents also appears to have
been motivated by a desire to avoid legal liability, which could have been asserted by IBM or a buyer
of its patents. 182
Several others of the top ten purchases appear to have had defensive intents. For example,
Intellectual Ventures (IV) purchased a large number of patents from defunct photography company
Eastman Kodak. According to public reports, the deal was organized by IV and RPX Corporation
on behalf of twelve intellectual property licensees, with each licensee receiving rights with respect to
Kodak’s digital imaging patent portfolio and related patents. 183 In another apparently defensive move,
when Alphabet (Google) sold Motorola’s mobile business to Lenovo, it retained the patent assets,
which were assigned back to Alphabet when Google was reorganized. (FIG___, Lenovo Group to
Alphabet Inc.) [CC to add cite – ask me for it]
As discussed earlier, scholars have previously considered the impact of the patent sales on the
propensity of patents to be litigated. While my research on the topic did not find an increase in the
likelihood of litigation upon transfer, 184 Serrano and his colleagues found that it depended on the
context and that transfers from individual inventors to larger entities reduced the likelihood of
litigation, on average, and from larger to certain smaller entities, the likelihood of litigation increased. 185
But while the transactions just described appear to be motivated by the desire to avoid patent
enforcement, one transaction in the top ten appears to be effected the liability transfer in another
direction, to a party with advantages in enforcement and licensing. In 2014, Qualcomm purchased
hundreds of HP patents covering the company's mobile computing technology. 186 Few financial
details or intentions with respect to the patents concerning the deal were released, 187 but Qualcomm
makes about a third of its revenue from licensing patents. 188 While it cannot be predicted with certainty
what exactly Qualcomm will do with its acquired patents, the firm is arguably better equipped than
HP to absorb the patents into its existing licensing and monetization efforts.
2. Transferring Technology
While the transfers just described supported liability transfers, in both directions, other top ten
transfers supported transfers of entire businesses and technologies. For example, chip manufacturing
181 Gene Quinn & Steve Brachmann, Facebook and Twitter: Patent Strategies for Social Media, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 14, 2014),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/02/14/facebook-and-twitter-patent-strategies-for-social-media/id=48004/.
182
See
Patent
Market
Tracker
Fall
2015
Key
Trends,
INNOGRAPHY
(2015),
https://www.innography.com/public/upload/files/general-files/Innography-Patent-Market-Tracker.pdf.
183
Kodak
Announces
Sale
of
Patents,
KODAK
(Dec.
19,
2012),
http://www.kodak.com/ek/US/en/Kodak_Announces_Sale_of_Patents.htm.
184 See Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 283, 320 (2011).
185 Galasso, et al. supra note ____.
186
Jeffrey
Burt,
Qualcomm
Buys
Palm
Patents
from
HP,
EWEEK
(Jan.
24,
2014),
http://www.eweek.com/mobile/qualcomm-buys-palm-patents-from-hp.html.
187
Jeffrey
Burt,
Qualcomm
Buys
Palm
Patents
from
HP,
EWEEK
(Jan.
24,
2014),
http://www.eweek.com/mobile/qualcomm-buys-palm-patents-from-hp.html.
188
See
Qualcomm
Inc.,
Annual
Report
38
(Form
10-K)
(Sept.
27,
2015),
http://investor.qualcomm.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1234452-15-271&CIK=804328 (showing that about $8B out of
the firm’s $25B in revenue is from licensing).
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has long been among IBM’s many activities, but has caused IBM to lose money in recent years. 189 In
2014, IBM entered into a deal to transfer its facilities to GlobalFoundries, which would continue to
operate and produce chips for IBM in exchange for around $1.5 billion in cash. 190 As part of the deal,
a large number of patents was transferred to GlobalFoundries. (FIG.___ ) In another divestiture, IBM
sold its personal computer business, including a large number of IBM’s patents, to Lenovo group, 191
for $1.75 billion. 192 Other patent transactions in the top 10 appear fit the pattern of being part of a
larger business transfer, of HP’s Palm unit to TCL, 193 and of the combination of assets of Fujitsu and
Panasonic to form Socionext, a chipmaker. 194
3. Patterns of Patent Transfers – From Old to Young and Rich to Poor
Although each transfer in the top ten had its own motivation, strikingly, each one reflected a
similar pattern. In every case, the software patents were being transferred from an older company to
younger company. (FIG. ____ ) More often than not, the transfer also reflected movements from the
company with greater revenue to the company with less revenue. Because the top transactions of any
set are often unique, and cannot be generalized to the entire set, we investigated whether the transfer
patterns observed at the top — from older to younger companies, and from companies with more
revenue to companies with less revenue — were observed among transactions in general. Using the
methods described previously, we were able to match 45% of the transfers. Because we had to exclude
transactions to and from individuals from the analysis, as well as companies that did not have an

189 Joel Hruska, IBM Sells Chip Business to GlobalFoundries for $1.5 Billion (Updated), EXTREMETECH (Oct. 20, 2014),
http://www.extremetech.com/computing/192430-ibm-dumps-chip-unit-pays-globalfoundries-1-5-billion-to-take-thebusiness-off-its-hands.
190 Id.
191 The IBM/Lenovo Deal: Victory for China?, UNIV. PA.: KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Jan. 14, 2005),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-ibmlenovo-deal-victory-for-china/.
192 Id.
193 Eric M. Zeman, TCL to Revive Palm with Help from the Tech Community, PHONE SCOOP (Jan. 6, 2015),
http://www.phonescoop.com/articles/article.php?a=15128.
194 Id.
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FIG__: Transfers of Software Patents by Age of the
Parties (2012-2015 transactions)
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2015
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*Data represents 45% of recorded software patent transfers

English-language website from which founding year data could be easily determined, the analyzed
transactions are likely skewed toward larger, more successful companies. For the revenue data, the
match rate was also about 44%, because I excluded all private companies from the analysis due to the
lack of reliable sources of private company revenue. The findings are presented in FIGS. ____ and
___.
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The results are striking. The patterns of old to young, as well as all higher to lower revenue
company software patent transfers were observed, not just among the top sales, but more generally.
Across our dataset, sales of software patents were between two and three times more likely to be from
an older company to a younger company (73%) than from a younger company to an older company
(27%). The difference between the observed distribution and a distribution in which transfers were
equally likely to go from a younger to an older entity and from an older to a younger entity was
statistically significant, in every single year of our sample. 195 To rule out the possibility that the results
were unduly skewed by transactions involving large numbers of patents, we ran statistical tests at the
deal level, rather than the individual patent, level. The results were similar. 196 Among transactions
between public companies of different revenue levels, the majority of patents also moved from higher
revenue to lower revenue companies. Sales were, on average, more than four times more likely to be
from a company with more revenue to a company with less revenue (71%) than vice versa (29%). This
difference was maintained across the years of the study, and was statistically significant in each year at
both the individual patent transfer level and the deal level. 197
To test how unique these patterns were, and whether they were true of patent transfers in general,
rather than mere artifacts of software patent transactions, I replicated the analysis among a subset of

195 I used a standard chi-square test to examine the null hypothesis that, in a given year, software patent transfers were
equally likely to go from an older to a younger company as vice versa, yielding p-values of 0 to 1.6197E-81. A p-value of
less than .05 is generally interpreted as an indication that the null hypothesis can be rejected (making it statistically
significant), while a value greater than 0.10 is viewed as showing that any differences are not statistically significant. See
Appendix __ for exact p-values.
196 On average, 60% of deals were from an older to a younger company, and 40% were from a younger to an older
company. Running a chitest (using excel’s CHITEST function) that compared the observed distribution to an even
distribution, the p-values were 0 to 8.17389E-54. See supra for an explanation of the significance of these values, and
Appendix __ for exact p-values.
197 See Appendix __ for the p-values.
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biotechnology patent transfers. 198 Biotech patents were also more likely to be transferred from older,
higher-revenue companies to younger companies with lower revenues. But, the transactions were
more evenly split among transfers to older and younger companies, and those with higher and lower
revenues. 47% of biotech patent transfers were to older companies, and 53% to younger companies.
45% of biotech transfers were to public companies with more revenue, and 55% to companies with
less revenue. Neither of the differences between the observed values and an equal distribution were
consistently statistically significant across the tested years; 199 in contrast to the significance of software
transfers. This may reflect, in part, the relatively fewer observed biotechnology transfers. 200
While striking at first blush, the movement of software patents from older, relatively higher
revenue companies to younger, lower revenue companies has several explanations. For several decades
there has been a “patent arms race” among technology companies, as companies have filed patents
early and often, to deter suits by competitors or other operating companies. 201 But as a company
matures and evolves, its needs change, including its need for all of the patents in the portfolio. Rather
than just retiring the patents, companies can sell them to those who can make better use of them.
Younger companies with rapidly increasing revenues, in turn, need patents to protect against potential
patent demands: indeed, companies, like Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn have found the option to
buy patents attractive. These types of transfers benefit both parties, as patentholders are able to recoup
some of the costs of R&D and fund additional innovation, and patent-receiving companies can avoid
delays and uncertainty at the USPTO and buy, rather than build, their own patent portfolios.
When a patent transfer is part of a larger business transfer the acquired business is rewarded not
only for its existing revenue, but for its investment in future products and services. It provides more
flexibility for the transferor to develop the technology, either on its own or with commercialization
partners. Because they are portable, portfolios of patents can provide scaffolding and support for
business transactions, making it easier to transfer technology and the rights to exclude others from
practicing them.
But the profile of rent transfers from small to large companies, without any accompanying
technology, also supports criticisms that software patents are, effectively, a tax on innovation. Though
younger companies get patents, they must pay for them, forcing a transfer of wealth from the relatively
younger to the relatively older company. When only patents, not technology, are transferred, the
welfare effects can be ambiguous, as the gain to the larger patent holder must be weighed against the
cost to the smaller patent implementer, without the exchange of technology. When the patents are
transferred and then asserted against independent development and practice of the patent, the “tax”
can be widespread, encompassing not only the independent developers, but also the users, of
technology. 202

198 N=1093 biotech patent transfers, for the revenue analysis, and N=995 biotech patent transfers, for the age analysis.
199 See Appendix __.
200 Biotech patent transfers differed in other ways from software patent transfers. Among the top ten, almost all involved
less than 100 biotechnology patents, while among top transfers of software patents, most involved more than 500 software
patents. This skew in size of top transactions is reflected in a much larger average transaction size, of 7.5 software patents
vs. 2.4 biotech patents, per transfer, although, as described below, for both types of patents, the median and mode number
of patents per transaction was 1.0.
201 For an overview of the industry and firm-level dynamics that have shaped the marketplace for high-tech patents, see
Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace, supra note ___.
202 Described, e.g. in Chien and Reines, supra note ____ .
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If patent sales have been in support of both technology and liability transfers, what about patent
licenses? The next section describes the analysis we performed to probe the motivations for licenses,
and the results we found.
AMONG MATERIAL SOFTWARE LICENSES REPORTED TO THE SEC, PATENTS ARE
FACILITATING THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
While software patent sales can provide some insight into the extent to which technology and
rights are distributed, parties are not required to disclose, much less register, how they intend to use
of the transferred patent. A more granular perspective on the substance of the innovation transfers
can be gleaned by looking at licenses in which licensor and licensee usually spell out their intentions
for the patents. The problem with licenses, however, is that they are largely not available for inspection.
In the following analysis, we skirt this obstacle by relying on material technology licenses recorded
with the SEC, though it bears repeating that these license are highly selected and nonrepresentative of
licenses in general. In the remaining paragraphs, I describe the results of our in-depth review of these
agreements for indicia of the software innovation being transferred through them.
Contrary to other studies, we find evidence in this dataset that patents are supporting the
transfer of technology, not just freedom from suit. Among licenses where patent are “core,” patents
generally support the transfer of trade secrets, know-how, or other proprietary information, consistent
with theories of how patents resolve the Arrow information paradox. However, non-patent
proprietary assets – in particular code and trade secrets – are more commonly transferred than patents.
In addition, the presence of intellectual property in the agreement does not necessarily impact the
exclusivity profile of the license – that is to say, licenses were just as likely to be exclusive, nonexclusive, or regardless of intellectual property protections. This suggests that in many cases, contract
law, rather than patent or other intellectual property, may be doing the heavy lifting.
1. Among Patent Software Licenses reported to the SEC, Patents are Supporting the Transfer of
Technology
Though studies described earlier have documented the use of licenses to support the transfer of
both technology and liability, current research suggests that in recent years, when licensees are
approached to take a license, they walk away from the deal with little more than a way to avoid costly
litigation. 203 Recent studies of patent licensing cast patent licenses in a similar light, characterizing them
as always conducted in the shadow of litigation, rather than, for example, the shadow of
competition. 204 To test the extent to which patent licenses were merely providing a shield from
litigation, with little additional benefit, we looked directly at the terms of licenses. We found some
evidence consistent with the idea that patent-related clauses within agreements primarily served the
203 Feldman and Lemley, supra note ___ (“finding that very few patent license demands actually lead to new innovation;
most demands simply involve payment for the freedom to keep doing what the licensee was already doing.”)
204 Jonathan Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, 110 NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L. REV. 1115 (2015). William Lee
and A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 385 (2016) [pincites and
parentheticals needed]
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role of confirming or shifting liability. Out of the 1,431 software technology licenses, patents were
mentioned 66% of the time (N=1,163). However, on closer inspection, the majority of these mentions
were incidental to the actual subject matter of the license, as patents were mentioned not as the subject
matter of the grant, but, in the majority of cases, as part of an indemnity or limitation of liability clause
(N=683, or 60% of software technology licenses where patents were mentioned). 205 That left only 480
agreements in which patents were considered “core.”
We removed licenses that also effected asset transfers, leaving 245 licenses. We studied the terms
of these licenses, and, as earlier studies have done, coded the extent to which the agreement was a
“naked” patent license, or a license that also included the transfer of trade secrets of all forms
(including know-how, proprietary information, and confidential information), computer code, or
trademarks. We found that, among registered material agreements to transfer software innovation, the
licensing of patents was usually accompanied by the transfer of know-how, code, and other proprietary
assets. The vast majority (98%, 240/245) of these patent licenses included trade secrets of some form,
or some sort of computer code (generally object code), source code, library, bug fix, and/or executable
(95%, 232/245). That is to say, in contrast to some evidence that patent licenses almost never include
other forms of technology transfer, we found the opposite – that the patent licenses in our study
almost always included trade secrets or source code, and often both. (FIG. ___)

205 See, e.g. the following mentions of patents within agreements: [NOTE TO EDs: this and other footnote paragraphs
should be reformatted so they aren’t stretching across as such]
“5 INDEMNIFICATION
5.1
Agilent
shall
defend
and
indemnify
Ansoft
and
hold
it
harmless
from
any
and
all
losses,
damages,
costs
and
out-of-pocket
expenses,
including
reasonable
attorneys'
fees,
incurred
by
Ansoft
that
result
from
any
claim,
lawsuit,
proceeding,
or
other
action,
whether
legal
or
equitable,
by
a
third
party
alleging
that
the
unmodified
Agilent
HFSS
Software
Products
or
the
Domain
Name
infringes
any
copyright,
trade
secret,
patent,
or
other
intellectual
property
right,
anywhere
in
the
world.
Counsel
provided
by
Agilent
to
represent
Ansoft
shall
be
mutually
acceptable
to
both
parties.
Ansoft
may
participate
in
any
such
claim at its own expense.”
Exhibit 10.12, AGILENT HFSS TECHNOLOGY LICENSE AND TRANSITION AGREEMENT (effective May
2001), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/849433/000095015203007071/j0226301exv10w12.txt
“10.10 No Other Licenses. Nothing in this Agreement will be deemed to grant, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise, a
license under any of Parthus’s existing or future patents; however, Parthus agrees that it will not assert any of its rights
under such patents against Licensee or its Customers based on the manufacture, use, sub-license or distribution of the
Licensed Products as permitted by this Agreement. Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be construed as conferring
by implication, estoppel or otherwise upon either party hereunder any licenses or other right except the licenses and rights
expressly granted hereunder to a party hereto.” Exhibit 10.21 PARTHUS TECHNOLOGIES PLC LICENSE
AGREEMENT
(undated),
available
at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1173489/000095016802002982/dex1021.htm
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Transfers Among
Software-Patent Agreements (N=245)

Transfer of Trade Secrets

Transfer of Code

The transfer of technology, as opposed to naked patent rights, was striking. In contrast with
licensor-initiated licenses, the significant technology agreements we studied largely reflected mutual,
rather than one-sided, interest, and the ex ante, rather than ex post, licensing of technology. This
suggests that patents play an integral role with respect to both types of transfers.
a) Patent Borders
We also tested the theoretical roles of patents by studying actual agreements. Consistent with
prospect theory, within agreements, patents provided a way to identify the subject matter of the
transfer. In the following example clause from a license, patents are used to designate not only the
technology being transferred, but also the technology not being transferred:
(i) TECHNOLOGY – Technology, as used herein, shall mean and refer to the algorithms,
software and hardware designs, and methods relating to the field of image processing,
specifically to the efficient coding and compression, decoding and decompression of video
images, described in Differential Order Video Encoding System, US Patent #5,739,861, issued
Apr.14, 1998. Japan Patent #3441736 issued Sept. 2, 2003. Canada Patent #2,252,545, issued
July 13, 2004 and Patents Pending in E.U. and Korea, as well as certain related trade secrets,
including invention, know-how, trade secret, function, design and any other features related
to software that embody or are based upon the patents referred to herein and/or other
proprietary intellectual property contained in Source Code. The term “Technology” shall not
include, mean or refer to, and nothing contained anywhere in this Agreement shall confer or
be deemed to confer upon ICOP any rights in or to, any of the algorithms, software and/or
hardware designs, and methods relating to the field of image processing described in US
Patents 5,164,819 (Method and System for Coding and Compressing Color Video Signals)
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issued November 17, 1992, and US Patent 5,448,296 (Variable Parameter Block Coding and
Data Compression System) issued September. 5, 1995. 206
It’s difficult to know, in the abstract, whether or not a given agreement would have been signed
without a patent. Besides showing up in an agreement, before the point of the transaction, a patent
may have motivated the initial invention and supported the inventions’ subsequent disclosure. What
about in the example above? One might argue that the deal would have been much harder to reach
in the absence of the patents, given the disclosing party’s strict delineation of rights. In addition, the
patent’s terms defined the scope of the agreement, making it easier for the parties to transact. In some
of the agreements, the definitional role of patents extended not only to the subject matter of the
technology, but also to other terms of the agreement, such as its duration. 207
However, patents may cut the other way too. The presence of a patent can lead to deals not getting
done, insofar as it widens the gulf between the patentholder, who may view the technology as that
much more valuable because of the patent, and the prospective licensee, who cares only about the
technology. When surveyed about why deals don’t get done, licensing executives have pointed to the
inability to reach agreement on price as the top reason. 208 Transactions involving IP assets are
perceived as being more complex and costly to evaluate. 209
In addition, in some subset of cases, parties who are determined to transact will figure out ways
to do so, with or without patents. After all, in the majority of SEC software agreements, patents were
not core. The next section provides additional context for understanding the role of patents, and
intellectual property in general by comparing other types of transfers, and the impact of the presence
of IP on exclusivity provisions.
2. Non-Patent are More Prevalent than Patent Protections in Transferring Software Innovation, and
Exclusivity Does Not Depend on the Presence of IP
If patent rights were not being transferred in the majority of software agreements, what was being
transferred? We relied on codings by kTMine to probe this question. We found that although patents
were core to the transfer in about 34% of software agreements (480/1,419), other forms of intellectual
property and proprietary technology were more prevalent and likely to be transferred . Trade secrets,
proprietary rights, know-how, or related rights were core to 38% of the agreements, 210 while various
206 SOFTWARE DECODE LICENSE AGREEMENT between Showlei Associates and ICOP Digital (dated
January 7, 2005), available at http://contracts.onecle.com/icop/showlei.lic.2005.01.07.shtml
207 See, e.g. “Section 6.01 - Expiration of Agreement: Unless this Agreement already has been terminated in accordance
with the provisions of Section 6.02, this Agreement shall terminate five years from effective date or with the expiration of
the last patent, whichever is first, and thereafter is renewable at LICENSEE’s request at terms and conditions in force at
the time of renewal.” DIGITAL AUDIO SYSTEM LICENSE AGREEMENT (Professional Encoders) between Dolby
Laboratories and Scopus Network (effective August 2003).
208 Cockburn, supra note ___, at Table 5.
209 Id. at 7.
210 542/1,431 = 38%. A single agreement could effect the transfer of more than one type of right, for example, patent
rights and trade secrets. We took a closer look at a few agreements in which trade secrets were transferred in the absence
of patent rights. In one case, the agreement specifically referred to “unpatented inventions (LICENSE AND SERVICES
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forms of software – executables, source code, programs, bug fixes, libraries, operating systems,
algorithms, and other software building blocks – were transferred in 88% of cases. 211 (See Appendix,
XFIG.___) Copyright provisions were also pervasive, specifically showing up in about 31% of
agreements, a number that potentially understates the importance of copyright, given the automatic
nature of copyright. A combination of trade secret, contractual safeguards, copyright, as well as patent
measures supported the bulk of the agreements.
In accordance with previous studies, we also looked at the exclusivity provisions of the licenses in
this dataset to understand the extent to which intellectual property supported a contract’s terms. In
comparison to generally non-exclusive, “open source” software licensing agreements, the licenses we
studied were at times exclusive, but more frequently, non-exclusive or multi-exclusivity, for example,
by being exclusive in one territory or field of use, while non-exclusive in another. 212 Among all
agreements, 34% had exclusive terms, 4% had non-exclusive terms, and 62% of the licenses were
“multi-exclusivity.” 213
The presence of patents or other forms of intellectual property 214 had ramifications for the amount
of exclusivity. One of the arguments made in favor of intellectual property is that it provides a
quantum of rights that can then be reduced or otherwise tailored by contract to fit the circumstances.
The overwhelming majority of the software contracts (96%) fit this pattern, insofar as they contained
some measure of exclusivity. However, it is also the case that intellectual property was not always
needed to support this range of exclusivity options. Even when intellectual property was not a key
component (N=558), non-exclusive and multi-exclusivity, rather than non-exclusive, provisions
predominated, at almost the same rate as they did in intellectual property agreements (FIG ___) .
Among these agreements, contract law appears to be doing much of the work in terms of allocating
rights between parties.
V.

CONCLUSION

Software innovation is transforming the US economy. Yet, the paid market for software
innovation is poorly understood, in part because of a lack of public information about the licensing
and transfer of innovation between firms. This paper skirts these obstacles by drawing upon several
proprietary datasets, exploring the market for software innovation through the lens of patent licenses
and sales. I find that despite the intense academic and policy focus on software patent litigation,
software patents are much more likely to be transferred than litigated (1.4-2.4% odds of being sold
per year vs. 1-2% odds of being litigated per lifetime), and argue that more attention should be paid
to the market for innovation. Further, although the Supreme Court and new procedures have made it
harder to enforce software patents, I find that the market for software innovation remains remarkably
robust, with the number of software patents sold growing over 50% from 2012 to 2015. I attribute
this development to the robustness of the demand for patents providing freedom to operate, the
strength of software business models, and bargain shopping as the price of individual patents has gone
down.
AGREEMENT between Audible, Inc. and Audible.de GmbH (dated August 30,2004)), in another, the agreement
mentioned one or more patents were pending but had not been issued.
211 1,261/1,431 = 88%.
212 http://www.ktmine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/044-045-IPM_July_August_2013-Feat.pdf
213 1,308 of the 1431 software agreements had ascertainable exclusivity provisions. Of those 441 were exclusive, 809 were
multi-exclusive, and 58 were non-exclusive.
214 Copyright, trade secret, or trademark and related rights.
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This paper distinguishes between transfers to support the transfer of technology as opposed to
mere transfers of liability (generally through naked patent licenses). Contrary to other studies, I find
that the majority of significant software patent agreements registered with the SEC (N=245) support
true technology transfer. However, trade secret and code were more important than patent for
transferring software innovation between firms. In addition, it appears that large numbers of patents,
are being sold to avoid litigation or provide freedom to operate, not to access technology for
development. The traditional narrative of patents enabling young companies to get access to the
commercialization capabilities of larger, more established firms isn’t supported by the data – patents
are two to three times more likely to go from an older company to a younger company, and from a
higher revenue to lower revenue public company, based on available data. When transactions are not
accompanied by the transfer of technology, this finding lends some support to the perception of
software patents as a tax on innovation that young companies must pay to older firms.
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VI.

APPENDIX
XFIG___ : The Distribution of Material Software Agreements Reported to the SEC Across Industries 215
(2000-2015)
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Table X___: Chi-Test Results

Shares
Year

2012
2013
2014
2015
All
P-Values
2012
2013
2014
2015
All

Software
Patent
TransfersTo Younger
Firm

Biotech
Patent
Transfersto Younger
Firm

Software
Patent
Deals- to
Younger
Firm

Biotech
Patent
Deals - Ages

Software
Patent
Transfers to Poorer
Company

Biotech
Patent
Transfers to Poorer
Company

1.7E-162
1.6E-81
1.4E-116
0.0E+00
0.0E+00

3.6E-10
3.3E-16
4.5E-01
8.4E-01
5.6E-03

0.0E+00
8.2E-54
3.1E-87
0.0E+00
0.0E+00

0.0E+002
2.9E-08
1.8E-09
1.0E-25
1.2E-03

7.4E-03
1.2E-02
4.4E-03
1.2E-03
1.2E-08

7.0E-01
8.0E-02
4.5E-03
1.1E-01
2.6E-01

215 A single agreement may be assigned to one than one more industry.

41

XFIG: ____

100%

Share of Software Agreements in Which Code,
Trade Secrets, Patents, or Copyrights Were
Considered Core

80%
60%
40%
20%

0%

Computer Code

Trade Secrets

Patents

Copyright

XFIG: ____

80%

Exclusivity Provisions Among Software Agreements (N=1,431)

60%
40%
20%

0%

Multi-exclusive

All

Exclusive

IP Keyword

42

Non-IP Keyword

Non-Exclusive

